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ELECTIVE TAXATION ON INBOUND 
REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT 
David J. Herzig∗ 
Since 1980, the United States has taxed U.S. real property gains 
of foreign investors. A nonresident must pay tax on the capital gain 
from the sale of U.S. real property or rights in U.S. real property, as 
well as on the sale of shares in non-publicly held domestic corpora-
tions that hold significant U.S. real property assets. The United States 
imposes a withholding liability on the purchaser based on a percent-
age of the purchase price. Moreover, by owning U.S. real property, 
foreign investors are subject to Internal Revenue Service (‘‘IRS’’) in-
vestigatory powers. Because of these rules, foreign investors spend 
significant resources to structure investment in U.S. real property as-
sets to avoid being deemed an owner of the underlying real property 
for taxation purposes. This has rendered the underlying statute, the 
Foreign Investment in Real Property Act of 1980 (‘‘FIRPTA’’), elec-
tive. This electivity results in the United States exhibiting tax haven 
characteristics for inbound real estate investments. Rather than tight-
ening the rules to eliminate this friction, Congress has recently pro-
posed even looser requirements. The resulting narrative by practition-
ers and policy makers is that FIRPTA should be eliminated. The 
United States currently needs more, not less, collection of taxation. 
The fact that FIRPTA is either easily arbitraged or not properly col-
lected should not result in the repeal.  
This Article proposes a new way of addressing FIRPTA by ex-
panding the use of reporting requirements to capture the leakage and 
provide a mechanism for effectively eliminating the use of structuring 
to avoid the tax. Through the introduction of systems recently em-
ployed in the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (‘‘FATCA’’) re-
gime, Congress can implement an effective penalty structure to ensure 
proper collection of taxation and achieve the stated goal of 
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FIRPTA-----an equal tax burden independent of the status of the inves-
tor. The goal of the proposal is to have a more cohesive and coherent 
FIRPTA regime by replacing a gross income tax regime with a net in-
come tax regime with a backup withholding. Given the United States’ 
position as a market leader in a limited market, there should be a 
more aggressive tax collection stance taken. The U.S. real property 
market is relatively inelastic as compared to equities; thus, an aggres-
sive U.S. position will not have much if any downside. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The United States continues to rely more heavily on foreign capital 
for real estate and infrastructure investments.1 Special interest groups 
and members of Congress have advocated for the need for even more di-
rect investment in the U.S. real estate market.2 These groups claim that 
the U.S. real estate market requires roughly $1 trillion to ‘‘rebalance 
loans that are now ‘underwater’ and to facilitate refinancing of maturing 
commercial real estate debt.’’3 According to advocates, the need for in-
frastructure and real estate investments necessitates the most favorable 
investment paradigm.4 
There has been a concerted push by these groups to modify any  
barriers of entry for foreign investors into the U.S. real estate market. 5 In 
order to create the favorable investment paradigm, it has been argued 
that the largest barrier for foreign investors, the Foreign Investment in 
Real Property Act of 1980 (‘‘FIRPTA’’),6 should be eliminated or loos-
ened. The failure to do so ‘‘makes it more likely such investors will steer 
their money into non-U.S. real estate (e.g., in emerging Chinese or Indi-
an real estate markets), or non-real estate assets.’’7 In both 2010 and 
2011, legislation was proposed to make the FIRPTA requirements even 
                                                                                                                                         
 1. In fact, foreign investment in U.S. real property increased from less than $6 billion in 2009 to 
approximately $13.37 billion in 2010. Arleen Jacobius, Foreign Real Estate Investors Coming Ashore in 
U.S., PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS (Apr. 4, 2011), http://www.pionline.com/article/20110404/PRINT/ 
304049978. Currently, foreign investors own $70 billion worth of U.S. commercial real estate assets. 
See Beth Mattson-Teig, Foreign Investment in U.S. Real Estate Assets to Hit Record High, NAT’L REAL 
EST. INVESTOR (Aug. 19, 2015), http://nreionline.com/finance-investment/foreign-investment-us-real-
estate-assets-hit-record-high. 
 2. See Real Estate Jobs and Investment Act of 2011, H.R. 2989, 112th Cong. (2011); Real Es-
tate Revitalization Act of 2010, H.R. 4539, 111th Cong. (2010); Real Estate Jobs and Investment Act 
of 2010, H.R. 5901, 111th Cong. (2010); Willard B. Taylor, ‘‘Blockers,’’ ‘‘Stoppers,’’ and the Entity Clas-
sification Rules, 64 TAX LAW. 1, 33 (2010) [hereinafter Taylor, Blockers]; see also JAMES K. JACKSON, 
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS21857, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES: AN 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 9 (2013), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RS21857.pdf; Samuel D. 
Brunson, Repatriating Tax-Exempt Investments: Tax Havens, Blocker Corporations, and Unrelated 
Debt-Financed Income, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 225 (2012); Min Liang & Sunghoon Yoon, The Determi-
nants of Foreign Direct Investment in U.S. Real Estate: An Empirical Analysis (Sept. 2011) (un-
published M.S. thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology), available at https://dspace.mit.edu/ 
bitstream/handle/1721.1/68183/770682376-MIT.pdf?sequence=2. 
 3. REAL ESTATE ROUNDTABLE, FOCUS ON JOBS: A POLICY AGENDA FOR SUSTAINABLE 
ECONOMIC GROWTH 21 (2011) [hereinafter RER POLICY 2011], available at http://www.rer.org/ 
Advocacy/2011_Policy_Agenda.aspx (follow ‘‘Entire Publication’’ hyperlink).  
 4. See, e.g., Press Release, Ass’n of Foreign Investors in Real Estate, Foreign R.E. Investors: 
Buying but Seeking Improved Fundamentals and FIRPTA Reform Globally (Jan. 2, 2012), available at 
http://web.archive.org/web/20120227060001/http://www.afire.org/foreign_data/2012/press.pdf. 
 5. See, e.g., H.R. 2989; H.R. 4539; H.R. 5901; MARTIN NEIL BAILY & MATTHEW J. 
SLAUGHTER, HOW FIRPTA REFORM WOULD BENEFIT THE U.S. ECONOMY (2009), http://www.invest 
inamericacoalition.org/home/resource-library/independent-analysis (follow ‘‘How FIRPTA Reform 
Would Benefit the U.S. Economy’’ hyperlink); KENNETH T. ROSEN ET AL., FIRPTA REFORM: KEY TO 
REVIVING COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE 1 (2010), available at http://www.investinamericacoalition. 
org/docs/independent-analysis/real-estate-roundtable---firpta-reform-3-12-2010.pdf?sfvrsn=2. 
 6. Foreign Investment in Real Property Tax Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-499, § 1121, 94 Stat. 
2599, 2682. 
 7. RER POLICY 2011, supra note 3, at 21.  
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less stringent, thus creating an even more attractive investment atmos-
phere for foreign investors.8 
But the United States has dual goals regarding this inbound invest-
ment: not only to increase the attractiveness of the investment environ-
ment, but also to not decrease the collection of taxing revenues.9 
FIRPTA is designed to ensure the collection of the tax.10 The FIRPTA 
rules specifically were designed to ensure equal tax treatment of foreign 
and domestic investors by ensuring collection of tax on inbound invest-
ments.11 Despite the equal treatment aim, however, the United States has 
created an inbound investment environment where the rules are both 
easily avoided, and becoming less stringent.12 The effect is that foreign 
investors have an advantage. 
The pendulum has swung so far that, in attempting to attract foreign 
investors, the United States may be unnecessarily acting like a develop-
ing nation, giving up autonomy over its affairs in exchange for foreign di-
rect investment.13 The problem with the current rules is that despite the 
current economic conditions, the need for more capital, and the tax con-
ditions, the United States continues to be attractive for foreign inves-
tors.14 The strength of the U.S. real estate credit market and the devel-
oped U.S. bankruptcy system create an ideal portfolio investment. 
There are three distinct problems that the current incarnation of 
FIRPTA creates. First, there is no anti-abuse rule to stop structuring.15 
Second, there is a need to move closer to microeconomic efficiency of in-
                                                                                                                                         
 8. The legislation generally stalls because it cannot be shown with certainty how much foreign 
investment FIRPTA is inhibiting, what the revenue ‘‘offset’’ would be, and the political ramifications 
of supporting a lowering of a tax only affecting foreign investors. See infra Part II.D. 
 9. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare 
State, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1573, 1575--76 (2000); see also James R. Hines, Jr., Tax Policy and the Activi-
ties of Multinational Corporations, in FISCAL POLICY: LESSONS FROM ECONOMIC RESEARCH 401, 414--
15 (Alan J. Auerbach ed., 1997) (summarizing ten quantitative studies of foreign direct investment 
outbound and inbound to the United States, and concluding that while taxes are not the only determi-
nant, they nevertheless exert ‘‘a significant effect on the magnitude and location of [foreign direct in-
vestment]’’). 
 10. Not only is FIRPTA intended to have a tax bite at 35%, but it also requires non-U.S. inves-
tors to file U.S. tax returns and submit to the investigatory and subpoena powers of the IRS.  
 11. Victor Fleischer, A Theory of Taxing Sovereign Wealth, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 440, 463--65 
(2009); Richard L. Kaplan, Creeping Xenophobia and the Taxation of Foreign-Owned Real Estate, 71 
GEO. L.J. 1091, 1103 (1983). 
 12. See Taylor, Blockers, supra note 2, at 9--11. 
 13. Fleischer, supra note 11, at 491; Charles I. Kingson, The Coherence of International Taxation, 
81 COLUM. L. REV. 1151, 1162 (1981); Michael S. Knoll, Taxation and the Competitiveness of Sovereign 
Wealth Funds: Do Taxes Encourage Sovereign Wealth Funds to Invest in the United States?, 82 S. CAL. 
L. REV. 703, 708 (2009). 
 14. BAILY & SLAUGHTER, supra note 5, at 3--6; ROSEN ET AL., supra note 5, at 6--8; Liang & 
Yoon, supra note 2, at 6--8; Iliana Jonas, U.S. is Top 2012 Property Investment Pick, REUTERS (Jan. 1, 
2012, 1:04 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/01/us-commercialproperty-survey-idUSTRE80 
002P20120101. 
 15. See, e.g., Brunson, supra note 2, at 237--41; William A. Klein & Eric M. Zolt, Business Form, 
Limited Liability, and Tax Regimes: Lurching Toward a Coherent Outcome?, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 
1001, 1006--07, 1013 (1995) (investigating such questions as (1) why are taxpayers allowed to choose 
which tax regime that applies to their entity, and (2) if we are going to allow the choice, why is there a 
cost/price in electing favorable tax treatment? The authors conclude that it does not make sense to 
force taxpayers to adopt complicated, awkward, and inefficient forms merely to reduce tax liability). 
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bound investment.16 Finally, there is the lost revenue through conceal-
ment of assets. All these derive from the primary problem, from a tax 
perspective, that FIRPTA is an elective tax creating investment distor-
tions for foreign investors.17 This is contrary to the goal of the tax code-----
creation of a frictionless investment environment.18 This elective taxation 
through counsel creates deadweight loss and decreases efficiency.19 For 
example, if ‘‘a taxpayer faces two investment opportunities, one of which, 
Opportunity A, has an expected value of $X and the other of which, Op-
portunity B, has an expected value of $.9X, . . . the taxpayer would 
choose Opportunity A.’’20 Taxes often distort the choice, and after taxes, 
make Opportunity B the choice. ‘‘In the example, $0.9X rather than $X 
of total social wealth is created, simply because the ultimate value to the 
taxpayer is greater if the non-wealth-maximizing choice is made.’’21 
Thus, there is considerable social waste in a system that has the ar-
bitrary taxation of FIRPTA. FIRPTA creates an inefficient marketplace 
for foreign investors in U.S. real property.22 If the primary goal is to en-
courage foreign investment, this inefficiency should be eliminated.23 If 
there is an important tax rationale (e.g., protecting the tax gap) to keep 
FIRPTA, however, then there needs to be modification of the existing 
rules. 
To prevent elective avoidance of FIRPTA, Congress should require 
information reporting from financial institutions or other entities that 
                                                                                                                                         
 16. See, e.g., Terrence R. Chorvat, Ambiguity and Income Taxation, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 617, 
644 (2002); Roger H. Gordon & A. Lans Bovenberg, Why Is Capital So Immobile Internationally? 
Possible Explanations and Implications for Capital Income Taxation, 86 AM. ECON. REV. 1057, 1068--
71 (1996). 
 17. RER POLICY 2011, supra note 3, at 10; BAILY & SLAUGHTER, supra note 5, at 11--13; ROSEN 
ET AL., supra note 5, at 1. 
 18. See Ruth Mason & Michael S. Knoll, What is Tax Discrimination?, 121 YALE L.J. 1014, 
1019--20 (2012); Leigh Osofsky, Who’s Naughty and Who’s Nice? Frictions, Screening, and Tax Law 
Design, 61 BUFF. L. REV. 1057, 1060 (2013).  
 19. Diane M. Ring, One Nation Among Many: Policy Implications of Cross-Border Tax Arbi-
trage, 44 B.C. L. REV. 79, 126 (2002); David M. Schizer, Frictions as a Constraint on Tax Planning, 101 
COLUM. L. REV. 1312, 1315--16 (2001) (using ‘‘frictions’’ to explain why in some cases taxpayers pursue 
close substitutes of a prohibited transaction and in other cases they do not); Daniel N. Shaviro, Eco-
nomic Substance, Corporate Tax Shelters, and the Compaq Case, 21 TAX NOTES INT'L 1693, 1712 
(2000) (in the context of corporate tax shelter evaluations, there is dead weight loss where we push 
taxpayers to structure their transactions even more inefficiently to obtain a tax benefit); James W. 
Wetzler, Notes on the Economic Substance and Business Purpose Doctrines, 92 TAX NOTES 127, 128 
(2001) (‘‘To the extent that taxpayers still undertake tax planning despite the deadweight loss [caused 
by restructuring the transaction to avoid the tax penalty], a permissive approach to tax planning would 
be preferable because it would avoid the costs represented by the deadweight loss.’’); see also George 
K. Yin, Getting Serious About Corporate Tax Shelters: Taking a Lesson from History, 54 S.M.U. L. 
REV. 209, 216--18 (2001) (using ‘‘incremental changes’’ in tax law to combat tax shelters may produce 
more inefficiency and distortion if taxpayers decide to pursue an alternative but more costly path to 
their tax benefit). 
 20. David Hasen, Tax Neutrality and Tax Amenities, 12 FLA. TAX REV. 57, 79 (2012). 
 21. Id. 
 22. See supra notes 17--21 and accompanying text.  
 23. This is the position advocated in various reports issued by special interest groups. See gener-
ally BAILY & SLAUGHTER, supra note 5 (advocating for FIRPTA reform to benefit the commercial 
real estate market); ROSEN ET AL., supra note 5 (‘‘[T]he sizable economic benefits of reforming 
FIRPTA would exceed the small fiscal costs it would entail.’’).  
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process real property sales. Moreover, to assert its full jurisdiction over 
U.S. real property, FIRPTA should tax not only direct, but also, indirect 
sales of real property. The resulting position will allow the United States 
to capture the current leakage and level the playing field for domestic 
and foreign investors.24 
To support this thesis, Part II of this Article will examine the histor-
ical basis of FIRPTA. The legislative history demonstrates two main ra-
tionales for the enactment of FIRPTA in 1980. First, there was the xeno-
phobic view of the world in 1980.25 There was real concern at the time, 
although not supported by the actual data, about foreign ownership of 
U.S. real property.26 Second, there was the appearance of an unfair tax 
treatment of foreign investors.27 The primary concerns expressed in the 
debates leading up to the 1980 legislation were that (1) the exemption 
from capital gain taxation encouraged foreign investors to bid up the 
price of farmland, and (2) there should be tax equity between U.S. and 
foreign investors.28 Readers who already have an in-depth understanding 
of the tax provisions of FIRPTA and the structuring associated therewith 
may wish to start reading with Part IV. 
Part III of this Article will examine the ease with which FIRPTA 
can be avoided through various legal structures. Given the apparent so-
cial waste associated with FIRPTA, is it necessary to retain the tax? In 
order to advocate for the elimination of FIRPTA, the question of wheth-
er FIRPTA is a desirable inefficiency must be addressed. 
Thus with the apparent xenophobic focus of the 1980 legislation and 
the avoidance through structuring, Part IV of this Article will then exam-
ine if there are other rationales for the retention or rejection of FIRPTA. 
This Part will discuss the justifications of a sovereign for retaining the 
right to tax its real property, including the larger discussion of the source 
rules applied in international tax literature. Finally, this Part will examine 
the underlying rationales for taxing the ownership corporate shares that 
should apply to real estate. These results are especially true in sovereign 
land ownership regimes where the sovereign does not own all lands.29 
Part V will then conclude that there are desirable frictions and that 
FIRPTA should be modified to become effective. This Part will show 
that FIRPTA-type frictions are being expanded and not contracted. For 
example, Congress adopted a FIRPTA type withholding system in the 
                                                                                                                                         
 24. See infra Part V. 
 25. Kaplan, supra note 11, at 1092--95. 
 26. See U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, TAXATION OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN U.S. REAL ESTATE 1 
(1979) (report prepared as required by section 553 of the Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, 92 
Stat. 2763 (1978)) [hereinafter TREASURY REPORT]; Fleischer, supra note 11, at 463--65; Kaplan, supra 
note 11, at 1092--95. 
 27. Fleischer, supra note 11, at 463--65; Kaplan, supra note 11, at 1092--95. 
 28. TREASURY REPORT, supra note 26, at 47. 
 29. In China, for example, the state owns all land. Edward A. Gargan, China Sells Leases on 
Land to Foreigners for First Time, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 1988, http://www.nytimes.com/1988/03/ 
23/business/china-sells-leases-on-land-to-foreigners-for-first-time.html?_r=0.  
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recent Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (‘‘FATCA’’).30 Rather than 
attempt to successfully identify all the impermissible foreign bank ac-
counts, Congress relied on third party collection agents-----the banks-----to 
identify and collect the taxation due.31 This Article concludes that source 
countries should be permitted to tax the underlying real property. Then 
to build upon this conclusion, new legislation will need to be enacted that 
will capture the leakage under the current FIRPTA rules. This Part will 
provide a new framework by suggesting that all buyers of U.S. real prop-
erty would need to receive a W-9 or appropriate W-8 from the seller or 
withhold the appropriate tax due. 
II. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF FIRPTA 
FIRPTA is a surprisingly easy statute to explain. ‘‘FIRPTA general-
ly taxes a foreign person’s gain from the direct or indirect disposition of 
U.S. real property interests (‘‘USRPIs’’) as income effectively connected 
with a U.S. trade or business,32 thereby exposing foreign persons to tax at 
the rates applicable to U.S. persons.’’33 The sale of a USRPI is treated as 
effectively connected income subject to U.S. tax.34 It generally is recog-
nized that a variety of property ownership interests, such as working in-
terests in oil and gas properties in the United States, are also USRPIs.35 
FIRPTA captures not only direct ownership, but also ownership in a 
partnership owning such interests.36 Such ownership constitutes the own-
ership of a USRPI as well as the conduct of a U.S. trade or business.37 In 
contrast, royalties generally are considered ‘‘passive’’ income subject to 
the 30% (or lower treaty rate) tax.38 
FIRPTA originated at a time when there was a clear sentiment 
against foreign ownership of U.S. real property.39 There was an interest-
ing narrative leading up to the enactment of FIRPTA. During the early 
1970s, an increasingly hostile public discourse began ultimately leading to 
proposed legislation and a Treasury Report on the consequences to the 
                                                                                                                                         
 30. 26 U.S.C. §§ 1471--1474 (Supp. IV 2010). The law was part of the HIRE Act, Pub. L. No. 
111--147, 124 Stat. 71 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of 23, 26, and 49 U.S.C.). 
 31. TREASURY REPORT, supra note 26, at 47.  
 32. Willkie Farr & Gallagher, Client Memorandum, Oct. 7, 2011, available at http://www.willkie. 
com/~/media/Files/Publications/2011/10/Recently%20Introduced%20FIRPTA%20Reform%20Legisl
ation%20Wo__/Files/RecentlyIntroducedFIRPTAReformLegislationpdf/FileAttachment/Recently-
Introduced-FIRPTA-Reform-Legislation.pdf; see I.R.C. § 897 (2012). 
 33. I.R.C. § 897; see also Fred B. Brown, Whither FIRPTA?, 57 TAX LAW. 295, 301--03 (2004); 
Willard B. Taylor, Suppose FIRPTA Was Repealed?, 14 FLA. TAX REV. 1, 5--10 (2013) [hereinafter 
Taylor, Repealed]. 
 34. I.R.C. § 897(a)(1). 
 35. Id. § 897(c)(1)(A)(i). 
 36. Id. § 897(c)(4). 
 37. Id. § 897(c)(4)(B). 
 38. Taxation of Nonresident Aliens, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Taxation-of-Non 
resident-Aliens-1 (last updated Nov. 27, 2015).  
 39. Fleischer, supra note 11, at 491--92; Kaplan, supra note 11, at 1092--95; Knoll, supra note 13, 
at 713--14. 
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fisc of foreign ownership of real property.40 The final result of this 
groundswell was the enactment of the FIRPTA legislation in 1980.41 
FIRPTA was intended to resolve the structuring machinations that were 
utilized by foreign investors to avoid taxation on the sale.42 
A. Pre-FIRPTA Income Tax Provisions 
Prior to the 1960s, U.S. source investment capital gains of non-
resident aliens (‘‘NRAs’’) were not taxed.43 The most common rationale 
was that the location of assets was hard to determine.44 Real estate and 
certain tangible property were the exception.45 
In the late 1960s, section 871 of the Code was enacted; it taxed for-
eign persons engaged in a trade or business within the United States on 
their net income effectively connected with their U.S. trade or business.46 
The section 871 requirement, in application, has four distinct elements. 
Each element must be present for the imposition of taxation by the Unit-
ed States: (1) U.S. source income; (2) that is ‘‘effectively connected’’; (3) 
to a ‘‘trade or business’’; and (4) that is carried on in the United States.47 
For section 871 to apply in the pre-FIRPTA rule frame, each of the 
four elements would need to be present for a foreign real estate inves-
tor.48 In the case of a foreign real estate investor, the first requirement is 
clearly met. Rental or lease income from domestic real estate, developed 
or otherwise, is considered U.S. source income under the statutory sourc-
ing rules.49 Similarly, gains from the disposition of real property interest 
located inside the United States are also U.S. source income.50 
Generally, the fourth requirement is satisfied. If the investor’s real 
estate activities constitute a ‘‘trade or business,’’ it will be considered car-
                                                                                                                                         
 40. See TREASURY REPORT, supra note 26, at 15; Kaplan, supra note 11, at 1104--05. 
 41. Kaplan, supra note 11, at 1095. 
 42. Id. at 1104. 
 43. Steven Duke, Foreign Authors, Inventors, and the Income Tax, 72 YALE L.J. 1093, 1096--1100 
(1963).  
 44. ‘‘These nonresident aliens are exempted under the House bill from the tax on capital gains, 
including hedging transactions, it being found administratively almost impossible to collect the capital-
gains tax in such cases. This exemption will result in increased revenue from transfer taxes or from the 
income tax in the case of persons carrying on the brokerage business.’’ 80 CONG. REC. 8650 (1936); see 
also H.R. REP. NO. 74-2475, at 9--10 (1936); S. REP. NO. 74-2156, at 21--23 (1936).  
 45. WILLIAM H. BYRNES, DAVID J. HERZIG, & CHRISTOPHER M. SOVE, 12 MERTENS LAW OF 
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 45:2 (rev. 2016); see also Tow v. Comm’r, 36 T.C. 861 (1961); Hooper 
v. Comm’r, 26 B.T.A. 758 (1932). 
 46. The concept of effectively-connected income was introduced into section 871(b) of the Code 
by the Foreign Investors Tax Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-809, § 103(a)(1), reprinted in 1966-2 C.B. 
656, 664, and into section 882 of the Code by the same act, § 104(b)(1), reprinted in 1966-2 C.B. 656, 
671. See also WILLIAM H. BYRNES, IV, DAVID J. HERZIG, & CHRISTOPHER M. SOVE, 12 MERTENS 
LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 45:2 (2015); Eric T. Laity, The Foreign Base Company Sales 
Income of Controlled Foreign Corporations, 31 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 93, 113 (1998).  
 47. I.R.C. § 871(b)(1) (2012). 
 48. David F. Levy, Nonrecognition Transactions Involving FIRPTA Companies, 51 TAX NOTES 
INT’L 77, 85 (2008).  
 49. I.R.C. § 861(a)(4).  
 50. Id. § 861(a)(5).  
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ried on in the United States. The main issues in pre-FIRPTA rules are 
the second and third requirements. The central question is whether a 
foreign investor’s real estate activities constitute a ‘‘trade or business.’’ 
Because, like the fourth requirement, if a real estate investor’s activities 
constitute a ‘‘trade or business,’’ generally the income and sale profits 
will be considered ‘‘effectively connected’’ to that trade or business.51 
Whether ownership of rental real estate constituted a U.S. trade or 
business depended on the facts and circumstances, including the size of 
the investment, the number and terms of the leases, and the nature of the 
property.52 Net leasing one property would likely not have been treated 
as engaging in a trade or business.53 The greater the number of tenants, 
the shorter the lease terms; the greater the share of the costs incurred by 
the lessor, the more likely the lessor would have been deemed engaged 
in a U.S. trade or business.54 
A foreign investor whose ownership of real property did not raise to 
the level of a U.S. trade or business (or if there was uncertainty) could 
elect to treat all income or gain from real property held for the produc-
tion of income as income effectively connected with a U.S. trade or busi-
ness.55 Once made, this election remained in effect for all subsequent 
years and could only be revoked with the consent of the Service.56 
Although the taxpayer election could clarify the rules, section 871 
was an opt-in requirement.57 Many taxpayers, however, did not opt-in be-
cause there were ownership structuring mechanisms that allowed the 
avoidance of U.S. taxation on liquidation of the real estate.58 For exam-
ple, gain on liquidation of a corporation, as well as gain on the sale of a 
corporation’s assets followed by a liquidation of the corporation were, 
with specific exceptions, tax-free.59 A properly structured ownership enti-
                                                                                                                                         
 51. Id. § 864(c)(2)(A); Treas. Reg. § 1.864-4(c)(1)(i) (2013). The test is whether the income in 
question is ‘‘derived from assets used in, or held for use in, the conduct of [the taxpayer’s] trade or 
business.’’ Id. 
 52. See Kaplan, supra note 11, at 1098.  
 53. Rev. Rul. 73-522, 1973-2 C.B. 226; I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 80-29-005 (Mar. 27, 
1980) (ownership of working interests in U.S. oil and gas properties was a U.S. trade or business). But 
the Court of Claims rejected the IRS’s holding in Tech. Adv. Mem. 80-29-005 in Di Portanova v. Unit-
ed States, 690 F.2d 169, 174 (Ct. Cl. 1982) (‘‘To be engaged in the oil business requires active involve-
ment, personally or through an agent, in the operation of that business.’’). But see Lewenhaupt v. 
Comm’r, 221 F.2d 227, 227 (9th Cir. 1955) (selling four U.S. properties was a U.S. trade or business); 
Pinchot v. Comm’r, 113 F.2d 718, 719 (2d Cir. 1940) (considerable leasing and management activities 
with respect to eleven improved U.S. properties constituted a U.S. trade or business); De Amodio v. 
Comm’r, 34 T.C. 894, 898--99 (1960), aff'd on other grounds, 299 F.2d 623 (3d Cir. 1962) (leasing two 
U.S. properties was a U.S. trade or business).  
 54. See Pinchot, 113 F.2d at 719. 
 55. I.R.C. §§ 871(d), 882(d) (2012). 
 56. Id. § 871(d). 
 57. Id.  
 58. BYRNES, HERZIG, & SOVE, supra note 45. 
 59. In 1980, the General Utilities doctrine had not been yet repealed. Gen. Utilities & Operating 
Co. v. Comm’r, 296 U.S. 200, 205 (1935). Similarly, corporate buyers could purchase stock and gener-
ally obtain a step-up in asset basis under former section 334(b)(2). I.R.C. §§ 336--337, as in effect prior 
to the Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514 (‘‘1986 TRA’’). Treaties with ‘‘tax haven’’ jurisdic-
tions, such as the Netherlands Antilles and the British Virgin Islands, had not been terminated. 
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ty would allow the taxpayer to avoid taxation instead of electing into tax-
ation.60 
B. Government Reaction 
As early as 1970, the New York Times reported that ‘‘[f]oreign in-
vestors of moderate means are increasing their holdings in real estate in 
the United States through purchase of shares in so-called ‘offshore’ 
funds.’’’61 The fear of foreign ownership of U.S. lands had reached a peak 
by 1978. It was reported that ‘‘the rush among Europeans to buy farm 
land in the Midwest has pushed per-acre prices to record levels in a 
number of states.’’62 By the late 1970s, seven states had enacted laws bar-
ring nonresident aliens from owning land, and thirteen other states had 
imposed some limits.63 
Not only was there fervor about foreign ownership, but also about 
the aforementioned disparate tax treatment of similar investors. Thus, 
during the Revenue Act of 1978, a proposal was included to tax capital 
gain on the sale of agricultural land.64 The primary concerns expressed in 
the Senate debate were that (1) the exemption from capital gain taxation 
encouraged foreign investors to bid up the price of U.S. farmland, and 
(2) there should be tax equity between U.S. and foreign investors.65 Since 
this was the first time a measure like this was proposed, and the issue was 
not yet ripe in the political process, the provision was withdrawn and sent 
to Treasury to issue a report on ‘‘the appropriate tax treatment to be giv-
                                                                                                                                         
 60. There were other tax rules at that time that also supported the use of structuring. For exam-
ple, long-term capital gain of corporations as well as individuals enjoyed a preferential rate; the top 
ordinary income bracket was 70%; depreciation methodologies were limited (accelerated deprecia-
tion, but not ACRS or MACRS depreciation, was permitted for buildings); and, most importantly, the 
passive activity loss rules had not been enacted. 
 61. David A. Andelman, Foreign Investment in U.S. Property Growing, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 
1970; see also Carter B. Horsley, Foreign Investment in U.S. Properties Growing, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 
1973 (‘‘‘[L]arge [foreign] investors of wealth and sophistication’ had replaced the small foreign inves-
tors active in offshore investment funds in the nineteen-sixties.’’) (quoting John R. White, President of 
James D. Landauer Associates); Foreign Investing Held Strain on U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 1974 (re-
porting that Illinois Senator Adlai E. Stevenson would begin hearings on the situation; Stevenson ob-
served that ‘‘[f]oreign buyers are driving up land costs in many areas, and foreign ownership of natural 
resources like coal mines, timber and farm land can divert critical raw materials overseas instead of 
into the United States market’’). 
 62. Michael Goodwin, Everybody’s Getting In on Foreign Investor Action, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 
1978, at 4; see also Kaplan, supra note 11, at 1092. 
 63. By 1978, the following states had enacted statutes: Connecticut, Indiana, Kentucky, Missis-
sippi, Nebraska, New Hampshire, and Oklahoma. These provisions are compiled in 1 U.S. DEP’T OF 
AGRIC., MONITORING FOREIGN OWNERSHIP OF U.S. REAL ESTATE 58--94 (1979); Comm. on Foreign 
Inv. in U.S. Real Estate, Foreign Inv. in U.S. Real Estate: Federal and State Laws Affecting the Foreign 
Investor, 14 REAL PROP. PROB. & TRUST J. 1, 18--40 (1980); Javade Chaudhri & Jessie-Kay Weili 
Cheng, Note, Regulation of Foreign Investment in U.S. Real Estate, 33 TAX LAW. 586, 613--15 (1980) 
(summarizing state laws restricting foreign land ownership, limiting duration of ownership, and setting 
acreage limitations); Robert Lindsey, Foreign Investors Rush to Acquire U.S. Property as Haven for 
Funds, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 1978, at 40; Tax Sought on Foreign Farm Deals, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 
1979, at D2 (reporting that before the Iowa legislature banned all new sales to foreigners, ‘‘a two-year 
survey revealed that foreigners owned only 15,000 out of 36 million arable acres in Iowa’’). 
 64. See Pub. L. No. 95-600, 92 Stat. 2763 § 553. 
 65. TREASURY REPORT, supra note 26, at 47. 
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en to income derived from, or gain realized on, the sale of interests in 
United States property held by nonresident aliens or foreign corpora-
tions.’’66 
Treasury issued its report in 1979.67 The Report first clarified that 
the narrative of foreign ownership tipping to critical mass was incorrect.68 
The limited data available at the time showed relatively little foreign in-
vestment in U.S. real property generally and only slightly more propor-
tionately in U.S. agricultural land.69 For example, foreign persons owned 
only 0.3% of agricultural land in the counties surveyed.70 In 1977 and the 
first half of 1978, foreigners purchased land constituting 2% of the total 
acreage sold and perhaps 4% of the total value sold.71 
The Report highlighted the main structuring mechanisms that for-
eign investors could use which had tax benefits not available to U.S. in-
vestors. Those five structures were: (1) installment sales;72 (2) like-kind 
exchanges;73 (3) section 337 sales;74 (4) sale-liquidations;75 and (5) treaty 
shopping.76 The structuring ability of some foreign investors to avoid tax 
on their U.S. real estate gains results primarily from the statutory re-
quirement that such gains be derived from a ‘‘trade or business’’ in order 
to be subject to U.S. tax.77 
                                                                                                                                         
 66. Revenue Act § 553.  
 67. TREASURY REPORT, supra note 26, at 1.  
 68. Id. at 7--9  
 69. See id. at 8--9 (citing U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, Foreign Ownership of U.S. Farmland, 
Much Concern, Little Data, June 12, 1978 [hereinafter GAO, Foreign]) (For example, total receipts of 
foreign corporations the principle activity of which was real estate and total receipts of foreign-owned 
U.S. corporations engaged in real estate were only 3% of the total receipts of all real estate corpora-
tions and 1% of the total receipts of U.S. real estate corporations and partnerships). 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. (citing GAO, Foreign). 
 72. If the foreign person was not actually engaged in a trade or business in the years in which 
payments were received, the gain would not have been treated as effectively connected and would 
therefore have gone untaxed. 
 73. If U.S. real property is exchanged for foreign real property of like-kind, such an exchange 
would have been tax-free and gain from the sale of the foreign property would not have been subject 
to tax. 
 74. The sale of property by a company holding real property coupled by a complete liquidation 
of the company within one year. Under pre-General Utilities repeal I.R.C. § 337, the sale would have 
been generally tax-free and gain on the liquidation would not have been subject to tax.  
 75. A sale of shares of a company holding real property followed by the purchaser liquidating 
the holding company. The sale of shares would not be subject to U.S. tax. The liquidation would have 
been tax-free at the corporate level, except for recapture items, and the purchaser would have realized 
no gain (having obtained a stock basis equal to fair market value on the purchase of the stock). 
 76. An investment in U.S. real property through a foreign corporation located in a jurisdiction 
which had a treaty with the United States permitting an annual election to treat rental real estate in-
come as subject to tax on a net basis. A foreign corporation in such a jurisdiction would have made the 
election for years during which it owned the real estate, but would not have so elected for the year in 
which it sold the real property. TREASURY REPORT, supra note 26, at 46. See, e.g., Convention Be-
tween the United States of America and the Netherlands Antilles with Respect to Taxes on Income 
(the ‘‘NA Treaty’’), Article X, partially terminated as of January 1, 1988, with the interest article ter-
minated except for debt owing to a financing subsidiary that was issued on or before October 15, 1984, 
effective December 30, 1996. The same treaties often had a provision preventing the United States 
from imposing its secondary withholding tax on dividends or interest paid by the foreign corporation 
that were attributable to income from its U.S. business. See NA Treaty, article XII.  
 77. Kaplan, supra note 11, at 1103. 
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The Report was very critical of the structuring mechanisms used by 
foreign investors.78 The Report, however, was cautious in the manner to 
remedy the perceived structuring problems.79 It noted, for example, that 
taxing capital gain on the sale of shares in a corporation owning U.S. real 
estate would be a departure from prevailing international norms and 
would be difficult to enforce.80 For example, in the case of a ‘‘like-kind’’ 
exchange, it may be easier to impose a tax when U.S. property is ex-
changed for foreign property than when the foreign property is subse-
quently sold.81 
After the structuring discussion, the Report concluded that by 
avoiding tax on the sale of U.S. real property, a foreign investor probably 
bore a lighter U.S. tax burden than domestic investors.82 The Report con-
tinued to state that the investor might bear a heavier burden if such gain 
were subject to tax.83 Most important for the development of the 1980 
legislation, the Report also noted that taxing gain on the sale of all U.S. 
real estate (whether or not effectively connected with a U.S. trade or 
business) would generally be consistent with international tax practice.84 
After the 1979 Report, Treasury set forth the framework for the 
1980 drafting of the FIRPTA legislation.85 There was a clearly identifia-
ble distortion between foreign and domestic investors regarding domestic 
real estate.86 The extent of the impact on the fisc was yet to be deter-
mined. Clearly, however, there was public pressure and a public narra-
tive that this was a problem that needed to be addressed. Treasury’s rec-
ommendations were made in accord with its belief of international tax 
norms. For example, Treasury did not advocate a tax on the sale of 
shares of a corporation owning real property.87 
                                                                                                                                         
 78. TREASURY REPORT, supra note 26, at 35.  
 79. See id. at 46--48. 
 80. Id. at 53 (‘‘This, in turn, suggests than an appropriate and effective remedy may focus on one 
or more steps in the various processes by which gains which should be taxable are converted into tax-
exempt gains.’’).  
 81. Id. Similarly, it may be more difficult to impose a tax on the sale of corporate shares of a 
holding company, but it appears possible to deny the new owner an all but tax-free liquidation and 
step-up in basis. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Obviously, this is subject to much debate as there are many variables in the calculation of 
taxation. The report hypothesized that foreign investors were less likely than U.S. investors to have 
other U.S. income to offset with net losses from real estate investments. Id. at 50. 
 84. Id. at 52. 
 85. See TREASURY REPORT, supra note 26, at 50--52. 
 86. Id. 
 87. The letter transmitting the report to the House Ways and Means Committee was even more 
explicit on this point, stating: ‘‘The Treasury does not believe that taxing capital gain on the sale of 
corporate shares is desirable or practical. But to prevent unintended tax avoidance, the Treasury  
recommends modifying certain specific statutory provisions under which foreign taxpayers convert 
taxable gain on real estate into nontaxable gain.’’ Letter from W. Michael Blumenthal, Sec’y of the 
Treasury, to the Honorable Al Ullman, Chairman of the Comm. on Ways and Means, House of Rep-
resentatives (May 4, 1979). 
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C. 1980 Legislation 
In order to address the structuring problems identified in the Treas-
ury Report, Congress would need to change the definitional standards 
surrounding the use of ‘‘effectively connected’’ in the context of U.S. real 
property. But rather than modify the international taxation norm, Con-
gress, in FIRPTA, supplied a statutory condition precedent.88 Thus,  
[the gain] of a nonresident alien individual or a foreign corporation 
from the disposition of a United States real property interest shall 
be taken into account . . . as if the taxpayer were engaged in a trade 
or business within the United States during the taxable year and as 
if such gain . . . were effectively connected with such trade or busi-
ness.89 
This new statutory structure scheme would treat all gains as ‘‘effectively 
connected’’ if they resulted from a ‘‘United States real property inter-
est.’’90 Further, gains would be taxed at domestic rates for domestic tax-
payers.91 
Thus, the key to the new legislation was a new definitional term for 
‘‘United States real property interest.’’ Rather than have the term limited 
to a fee simple property ownership, the definition was more expansive, 
including leasehold interests among others.92 At the time, such leaseholds 
were not considered a typical real estate investment.93 The 1979 Treasury 
Report, however, did not address ‘‘real estate acquired for use in a non-
real-estate business (e.g. a manufacturing plant);’’ it was ‘‘concerned only 
with real estate which was leased or held for investment.’’94  
Congress did not stop there. It addressed the structuring problems 
created through the use of corporations. FIRPTA defined ‘‘real property 
interest’’ to include ‘‘any interest (other than an interest solely as a credi-
tor) in any domestic corporation.’’95 Thus, stock in a domestic corpora-
tion, or a loan to a company in which the investor also holds stock, is a 
‘‘real property interest.’’96 Although this rule would seem straightforward, 
it should surprise no one that in a tax context, there are often murky 
lines, even in determining when an interest represents ownership of a 
corporation. For example, sometimes nominally titled debt is in effect 
equity.97 In the domestic context, there are regulations and cases sorting 
                                                                                                                                         
 88. Kaplan, supra note 11, at 1104. 
 89. Id. at 1104 (quoting I.R.C. § 897(a)(1) (2012) (added by Foreign Investment in Real Property 
Tax Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-499, § 1122(a), 94 Stat. 2599, 2682)).  
 90. Id.; see also I.R.C. §§ 11, 55, 871(b)(1), 882(a)(1), 897(a)(1), 1201(a). But see id. § 897(a)(2) 
(modification of minimum tax on tax preferences as applied to nonresident aliens). 
 91. Kaplan, supra note 11, at 1104. 
 92. Id.  
 93. Id. at 1104--05. 
 94. TREASURY REPORT, supra note 26, at 2.  
 95. I.R.C. § 897(c)(l)(A)(ii). 
 96. Id. 
 97. Ilan Benshalom, How to Live with a Tax Code with Which You Disagree: Doctrine, Optimal 
Tax, Common Sense, and the Debt-Equity Distinction, 88 N.C. L. REV. 1217, 1228--30 (2010). 
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through those lines.98 In the 1980 legislation, however, there were no reg-
ulations, and the domestic regulations expressly disclaimed applicability 
to foreign uses.99 
As it turns out, the rule to include corporations was subject to two 
major exceptions. The first exception covers stock that is ‘‘regularly trad-
ed on an established securities market,’’ unless the investor holds more 
than 5% of that company’s stock.100 The purpose of this exception was to 
prevent the application of FIRPTA to shareholders in publicly traded 
companies.101 For example, although energy and gas companies own a lot 
of U.S. real estate, those shareholders would not be subject to 
FIRPTA.102 
The second exception applies to stock of a corporation that was not 
a ‘‘United States real property holding corporation’’ during the period in 
which the foreign investor held its stock.103 This exception applies if a 
corporation holds less than 50% of its real estate interests (both domestic 
and foreign) for use in a trade or business.104 At the time of enactment, 
the concept was that a tiered structuring would not be possible because 
of the look-through rules in the statute.105 If, for example, a corporation 
owns a ‘‘controlling interest’’ in a subsidiary corporation, the assets of 
that subsidiary are imputed pro rata to the parent in determining the 
parent’s status as a ‘‘United States real property holding corporation.’’106 
Congress understood the nature of unintended consequences; there-
fore, the statute stated that the Treasury should issue regulations ‘‘to 
prevent the avoidance of Federal income taxes.’’107 The Committee  
Report mandates that gain be recognized whenever property ‘‘would not 
be subject to tax on a later disposition of the property by the recipient.’’108 
The intent was for the Treasury to facilitate normal business transac-
tions, but only when the ultimate taxability of gain is not in jeopardy.109 
D. Recent Proposed Legislation 
FIRPTA has not been stagnant in application. But rather than a re-
strictive interpretation as was envisioned during the late 1970s and 1980 
legislation, there has been a recent push to expand the exceptions origi-
                                                                                                                                         
 98. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-0, 47 Fed. Reg. 164, 170 (Jan. 5, 1982). 
 99. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-1(b)(3), 47 Fed. Reg. 164, 171 (Jan. 5, 1982). The application of 
these regulations to international transactions was still being studied by the Treasury Department in 
the early 1980s. See 47 Fed. Reg. 164 (Jan. 5, 1982). 
 100. I.R.C. § 897(c)(3). 
 101. Kaplan, supra note 11, at 1105.  
 102. Id. 
 103. I.R.C. § 897(c)(1)(A)(ii).  
 104. Id. § 897(c)(2). 
 105. Id. § 897(c)(5)(A). 
 106. Id.; see also Temp. Treas. Reg. § 6a.897-1(f) (imputing ownership of assets to shareholders, 
partners, or beneficiaries); Kaplan, supra note 11, at 1106--07.  
 107. I.R.C. § 897(e)(2). 
 108. H.R. REP. NO. 97-215, at 277 (1981) (Conf. Rep.). 
 109. Id. at 280. 
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nally built in.110 The xenophobic narrative in the 1970s has been replaced. 
With the global economic meltdown of the last ten years, there is now a 
push for more foreign investment in the United States.111 The recent leg-
islation proposed starting in 2010 demonstrates the movement away from 
the original intent of the statute.112 Special interest groups have pushed 
for this legislation in order to encourage capital infusions into the United 
States by foreign investors.113 
The legislation would amend FIRPTA by removing some of the ar-
tificial tax barriers to foreign investment in U.S. real estate.114 The pro-
posers of the bill claimed that such changes are important to eliminate 
the current tax bias in favor of debt financing and to assist U.S. real 
property owners in accessing equity capital from around the world at this 
time of great distress in the debt and broader financial markets.115 
The bill would modify FIRPTA in a number of ways that could im-
pact the taxation of foreign investors that own interests in domestic real 
estate investment trusts (‘‘REITs’’).116 Several of the modifications relate 
to the percentage of stock that a foreign owner may hold in a publicly 
traded REIT before becoming subject to FIRPTA.117 The main provision 
was to increase the ownership threshold from 5% to 10%.118 
Despite the repeated support by Congress to try to pass the bills, 
they both failed.119 What rationales would cause seemingly benign legisla-
tion to fail? The proposed legislation did not eliminate FIRPTA, but ra-
ther, slightly expanded the scope of the exemption.120 There are three 
main theories on why the proposed legislation has failed. The first two 
are monetary. The first is the amount of economic loss preventing for-
eign investment as a result of FIRPTA.121 The second is the corollary that 
would be quantifying the amount of the loss of tax revenue from the 
                                                                                                                                         
 110. See BAILY & SLAUGHTER, supra note 5. 
 111. See id.; ROSEN ET AL., supra note 5. 
 112. Real Estate Jobs and Investment Act of 2010, H.R. 5901, 111th Cong. (2d Sess. 2010). 
 113. See ROSEN ET AL., supra note 5. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Taylor, Repealed, supra note 33, at 38.  
 117. Id. at 41. 
 118. This means that with respect to foreign persons owning not more than 10% of a publicly 
traded REIT: (i) a sale of REIT stock by the foreign owner would not be subject to FIRPTA (regard-
less of whether the REIT is domestically controlled), and (ii) capital gain distributions to the foreign 
owner that are attributable to gains from the disposition of USRPIs held by the REIT would not be 
treated as effectively connected income under FIRPTA, but instead would be treated as ordinary divi-
dends (subject to US withholding at a 30% rate, or lesser treaty rate).  
 119. 157 CONG. REG. S5910 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 2011) (statement of Sen. Menendez); H.R. 2989 
(112th): Real Estate Jobs and Investment Act of 2011, GOVTRACK, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/ 
bills/112/hr2989 (last visited Feb. 17, 2016); S. 1616 (112th): Real Estate Investment and Jobs Act of 
2011, GOVTRACK, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/112/s1616 (last visited Feb. 17, 2016). 
 120. Taylor, Repealed, supra note 33, at 41. 
 121. BAILY & SLAUGHTER, supra note 5, at 8. 
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elimination of FIRPTA.122 The final is simply the same xenophobic view 
of the world as in 1980.123 
There have been numerous attempts by special interest groups to 
quantify the magnitude of the first order problem of FIRPTA. The Real 
Estate Roundtable conducted two studies, one in 2009 and another in 
2011, to try to resolve the question.124 The reports, however, are unable to 
quantify exactly how much foreign investment FIRPTA is inhibiting. ‘‘It 
is difficult to quantify exactly how much foreign capital in-
to U.S. commercial real estate is deterred by FIRPTA.’’125 The reports 
instead rely on anecdotal evidence that FIRPTA inhibits the flow of for-
eign capital into the U.S. real estate market because ‘‘FIRPTA discour-
ages international investors from placing capital in U.S. real estate by 
levying additional taxes on equity investment that do not apply to other 
asset classes.’’126 The fallacy of these assumptions is that foreign investors 
are impacted by FIRPTA. FIRPTA is elective for foreign investors be-
cause of the structuring mechanisms. Thus, for sophisticated foreign in-
vestors that would be able to provide the capital-----over $1 trillion-----
needed to support the market, FIRPTA is optional for them already.127 
Therefore, not only can the amount FIRPTA is inhibiting not be proven, 
it is unlikely that FIRPTA prevents any investment inflow into the U.S. 
real estate market.128 
The more important Congressional concern is not how many for-
eign investors are not buying U.S. real estate, but rather the tax effect of 
the elimination of FIRPTA-----the so-called ‘‘tax offset.’’129 The stated 
problem with FIRPTA is that it generates very little revenue.130 ‘‘The 
Joint Committee on Taxation recently estimated that outright FIRPTA 
repeal would cost $8.3 billion over 10 years, less than $1 billion per 
year.’’131 Thus, the argument is that since FIRPTA’s investment distortion 
is high and the revenue generated is low, FIRPTA should be eliminat-
ed.132 ‘‘On balance, we think the sizable economic benefits of reforming 
FIRPTA would exceed the small fiscal costs.’’133 Once again, both the 
Joint Committee’s report and the special interest studies fail to address 
that FIRPTA’s tax impact is de minimis because it is elective through 
                                                                                                                                         
 122. Id. at 10. 
 123. See Tom Acitelli, Fussing Over FIRPTA, N.Y. OBSERVER, Feb. 11, 2010, http://observer. 
com/2010/02/fussing-over-firpta; Julie Satow, In a Slow New York Market, Brokers Expand Their Rep-
ertory, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/15/realestate/commercial/new-
york-brokers-expanding-their-repertory.html?_r=0. 
 124. BAILY & SLAUGHTER, supra note 5; ROSEN ET AL., supra note 5.  
 125. BAILY & SLAUGHTER, supra note 5, at 8. 
 126. ROSEN ET AL., supra note 5, at 1. 
 127. See Taylor, Blockers, supra note 2, at 9--11. 
 128. BAILY & SLAUGHTER, supra note 5, at 3--6. 
 129. Id. at 10. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id.  
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structuring. The more prudent course is to effectively capture the leak-
age rather than accept the minimal impact of the current elective form. 
Although the proposed legislation only modified the existing rules 
in a minimal manner, the proposal failed to garner any support primarily 
because it failed to quantify the impact of the legislation on revenue.134 
III. INVESTMENT TECHNIQUES 
FIRPTA was designed to collect tax without regard to the pre-1980 
structuring techniques. Unfortunately, advisors just moved from the pre-
1980 structuring to the post-FIRPTA structuring techniques. There are 
three main ways that investors deal with the FIRPTA issues: (1) high 
yield debt instruments; (2) REITs; and (3) blocker corporations.135 Each 
structure is designed for foreign investment in U.S. real property without 
triggering FIRPTA. The structures all have certain benefits and detri-
ments. For example, the following menu of choices provided by many 




A. High-Yield Debt Instruments 
There are a number of ways to invest in U.S. real estate. FIRPTA 
does not apply to investors in U.S. real estate if the investment is a 
‘‘straight debt.’’137 For this purpose, straight debt means that (1) the debt 
is not convertible into an equity interest in the underlying property; (2) 
the interest rate in the debt is not tied to the performance of the underly-
                                                                                                                                         
 134. See H.R. 2989 (112th): Real Estate Jobs and Investment Act of 2011, GOVTRACK, https://www. 
govtrack.us/congress/bills/112/hr2989 (last visited Feb. 17, 2016); S. 1616 (112th): Real Estate Invest-
ment and Jobs Act of 2011, GOVTRACK, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/112/s1616 (last visited 
Feb. 17, 2016). 
 135. COOLEY LLP & PROBITAS PARTNERS, U.S. REAL ESTATE FUNDS AND FIRPTA: 
STRUCTURES TO MAXIMIZE NET RETURNS TO NON-U.S. INVESTORS 10 (2014), available at https:// 
www.cooley.com/files/probitas_partners_cooley_FIRPTA_2014.pdf [hereinafter U.S. REAL ESTATE 
FUNDS AND FIRPTA].  
 136. See id. 
 137. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.897-1(d)(2)(ii)(C), (h) (as amended in 2003). 
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ing property; and (3) the upside is limited.138 If the debt is structured 
properly, and it qualifies as debt for income tax purposes, then a non-
U.S. investor could escape U.S. tax under FIRPTA on the repayment of 
the debt.139 This is true even if the debt is the economic equivalent of the 
underlying equity. 
The rules create certain structural challenges for the investor. Any 
mistake results in taxation. First, the instrument cannot be economically 
equivalent to an equity investment.140 For example, there cannot be sig-
nificant upside held by the non-U.S. investor. An unrelated party must 
invest a material amount alongside the non-U.S. investor as equity. This 
prevents the debt from being recharacterized as equity. Finally, the non-
U.S. investor cannot retain significant control rights over the borrower or 
the property itself.141 
Distinguishing debt from equity is not straightforward. Generally, 
equities are instruments that have no fixed maturity date and ‘‘a right for 
a residual profit that is subordinated to all other claims against the cor-
poration.’’142 ‘‘Debt instruments are funds transferred in return for a rea-
sonable expectation of repayment within a fairly short and well-defined 
period.’’143 Debt instruments often provide their holders with fixed peri-
odical interest payments until repaid.144 Generally, returns on equity are 
higher because of the risks associated with the investment, e.g., the many 
unforeseeable factors related to the success of the firm’s business strate-
gy.145 
As an investor, the ideal investment paradigm is one with the upside 
of equity and the downside protection of debt. Financial markets have 
responded with hybrid instruments that are classified as debt yet have 
many equity characteristics.146 The IRS and the courts have been careful 
to avoid creating any safe harbors or clear lines to distinguish between 
                                                                                                                                         
 138. See, e.g., TIM EDGAR, THE INCOME TAX TREATMENT OF FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS: 
THEORY AND PRACTICE 93 (2000); John C. Coffee, Jr., Systematic Risk After Dodd-Frank: Contingent 
Capital and the Need for Regulatory Strategies Beyond Oversight, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 795, 835--36 
(2011); Grace Soyon Lee, What's in a Name?: The Role of Danielson in the Taxation of Credit Card 
Securitizations, 62 BAYLOR L. REV. 110, 126--28 (2010). 
 139. See DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE ADMINISTRATION’S FISCAL 
YEAR 2016 PROPOSALS 100 (Feb. 2015), http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Doc 
uments/General-Explanations-FY2016.pdf. 
 140. See Benshalom, supra note 97, at 1228--30. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. at 1229; see also Anthony P. Polito, Useful Fictions: Debt and Equity Classification in 
Corporate Tax Law, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 761, 770--71 (1998). 
 143. Benshalom, supra note 97, at 1229. 
 144. Id.  
 145. Id.; see also RICHARD A. BREALEY ET AL. PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 147--49 (8th 
ed. 2006). 
 146. Michael S. Knoll, Financial Innovation, Tax Arbitrage, and Retrospective Taxation: The Prob-
lem with Passive Government Lending, 52 TAX L. REV. 199, 200 (1997); Daniel Shaviro, Risk-Based 
Rules and the Taxation of Capital Income, 50 TAX L. REV. 643, 652--53 (1995) (explaining how finan-
cial derivatives allow taxpayers to overcome risk-based rules to determine ownership by allowing tax-
payers to create synthetic instruments with similar cash flows to other instruments). 
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debt and equity.147 This was designed to prevent granting sophisticated 
taxpayers a roadmap for avoidance. The market, however, would just 
build this uncertainty into the pricing of the hybrid instruments. The reli-
ance of many Code provisions on the classification of an investment as 
debt or equity and, most importantly, the material financial consequenc-
es the classification often involves cause the debt-equity distinction to be 
one of the most frequently litigated issues in tax law.148 
The line between debt and equity can quickly become extremely 
blurry.149 For example, in a number of recent transactions, instruments 
have been issued that are designed to be treated as debt for federal in-
come tax purposes, but to be treated as equity for regulatory, rating 
agency, or financial accounting purposes.150 These instruments typically 
contain a combination of debt and equity characteristics.151 
An example of these hybrid instruments is provided in Revenue 
Ruling 2002-31.152 The Ruling posited a bond with the following charac-
teristics: (1) payments of contingent interest that would be triggered by a 
specified rise in the value of the bond (and therefore a rise in the value of 
the underlying stock); (2) payments are in amounts that increase in direct 
proportion to the dividends paid on the underlying stock; and (3) to the 
extent the trading value of the bonds reflects the value of the conversion 
premium, the payments are in direct proportion to the value of the un-
derlying stock.153 By paying more current interest at a time when conver-
                                                                                                                                         
 147. Katherine Pratt, The Debt-Equity Distinction in a Second-Best World, 53 VAND. L. REV. 
1055, 1057, 1058--93 (2000). 
 148. Benshalom, supra note 97, at 1225, 1237; Nathan R. Christensen, Comment, The Case for 
Reviewing Debt/Equity Determinations for Abuse of Discretion, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1309, 1310 (2007). 
 149. For example, prior to the 2010 enactment of I.R.C. Section 871(m), total return swaps were a 
favorite way of avoiding FIRPTA. See Linda Z. Schwartz, ABCs of Cross Border Derivatives, 
CADAWALADER WICKERSHAM & TAFT, LLP (June 26, 2015) at 62--34 (A total return swap is 
a payment under all notional principal contracts (‘‘NPC’’) (other than contracts with accelerated or 
uneven payments, such as swaps with an embedded loan component) that were sourced according to 
the residence of the recipient. Thus, most payments under an NPC received by a foreign holder were 
foreign source income not subject to U.S. withholding tax, except, under certain circumstances when 
the foreign holder was engaged in a U.S. trade or business. This sourcing rule applied to NPCs with 
respect to debt, commodities, and likely, stock, which permitted foreign holders of dividend-paying 
stocks who were subject to U.S. withholding on such dividends to swap their stock for the right to re-
ceive payments measured by dividends paid on such stock without incurring a U.S. withholding tax. 
For portfolio investors in countries without U.S. tax treaties, avoiding the 30% withholding tax on div-
idends was a powerful incentive to forego the voting rights associated with a direct investment in 
stock. Also, beginning March 18, 2012, I.R.C. Section 871(m) imposes a 30% U.S. withholding tax on 
any payment made to any foreign party on an NPC (or any substantially similar financial instrument) 
that (directly or indirectly) is contingent upon, or determined by reference to, the payment of a U.S.-
source dividend, except to the extent that regulations are issued that provide that the NPC (or other 
financial instrument) does not have the potential for tax avoidance). These equity swaps on USRPIs 
were effectively shut down with I.R.C. § 781(m). Some practitioners, however, continue to push by 
continuing the swaps because of Treas. Reg. Section 1.897-9T. 
 150. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 85-119, 1985-2 C.B. 60. 
 151. See, e.g., IRS Notice 94-47. 
 152. 2002-1 C.B. 1023 (2002). 
 153. Specifically, Corporation X issues for $625x a 20-year debt instrument with a stated principal 
amount of $1,000x. Except for the contingent interest payments described below, the debt instrument 
does not provide for any stated interest. The debt instrument is convertible at any time into a number 
of shares of Corporation X common stock having a value, on the date of issue of the debt instrument, 
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sion might otherwise be an attractive option to a holder, Contingent In-
terest Convertible Bonds (‘‘CICB’’) are structured to provide an incen-
tive to a holder not to convert early and are even less likely to be con-
verted than conventional convertible bonds.154 Accordingly, the con-
conversion option contained therein cannot subject CICB to section 
163(l).155 
The corporation takes the position that the CICB is debt.156 The 
Service agrees with the corporation.157 In the Revenue Ruling, the Ser-
vice explained the legislative history of section 163(l) with respect to 
conventional convertible bonds, which, as described above, applies the 
‘‘substantially certain’’ test and evaluates the likelihood of conversion by 
looking to the significance of a bond’s initial conversion premium.158 The 
Ruling explicitly rejects the argument that because the value of the issu-
er’s stock is used to construct the ‘‘projected payment’’ schedule required 
by the CPDI rules, that interest on the CICB is per se payable in stock.159 
Instead, the Ruling bases its conclusion that the bond is not a ‘‘disquali-
fied debt instrument’’ on the application of the ‘‘substantially certain’’ 
test.160 
The upside of using the high-yield debt instrument is that the for-
eign investor can receive high economic returns without U.S. tax. Proper-
ly structured high-yield debt instruments have no U.S. tax on distribu-
tions because it is classified as portfolio interest under Sections 871(h) 
and 881(c) of the IRC.161 Portfolio interest is generally defined as a debt 
obligation held by an identifiable foreign person.162 Although Section 
871(h) is designed to prevent the use of debt as equity in the foreign con-
text, it has largely been ineffective.163 The investor also receives fixed re-
turns that may be better than the underlying investment with a priority 
credit position.164 This may make the debt more valuable than the under-
                                                                                                                                         
that is significantly less than $625x. The debt instrument is part of an issue that is not marketed or sold 
in substantial part to persons for whom the inclusion of interest from the instruments in the issue is not 
expected to have a substantial effect on their U.S. tax liability. The amount of contingent interest that 
is payable is equal to the greater of (1) the regular cash dividend per share of Corporation X common 
stock for the six-month period multiplied by the number of shares into which the debt instrument may 
be converted, or (2) y-percent of the average market price of the debt instrument for the measurement 
period. The contingent interest is neither a remote nor an incidental contingency within the meaning 
of Treas. Reg. § 1.1275-2(h). 
 154. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.171-1 (2013). 
 155. Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, § 1005, 1997-4 (Vol. 1) C.B. 125. 
 156. Rev. Rul. 2002-31, 2002-1 C.B. 1023. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Rev. Rul. 2002-31, supra note 156; Victor Fleischer, Regulatory Arbitrage, 89 TEX. L. REV. 
227, 287 (2010). 
 160. Rev. Rul. 2002-31, supra note 156. 
 161. I.R.C. §§ 871(h)(4)(A)(i)(IV), 881(c)(4). 
 162. Id. § 871(h); Brunson, supra note 2, at 239. 
 163. Brunson, supra note 2, at 238--39. 
 164. Id. 
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lying property. Further, when the debt is sold, it is also without tax be-
cause of the standard rules involving the return of basis.165 
There has been at least one instance, however, when a company 
canceled a debt offering because of FIRPTA issues.166 As just discussed, 
convertible debentures (and other debt obligations that participate in the 
growth of income or growth in the value of a USRPI) issued by a U.S. 
Real Property Holding Company (‘‘RPHC’’) to foreign investors are ex-
empt. But in the case of Sun Company-----a publicly held U.S. energy re-
source company with substantial USRPI holdings-----they cancelled a pro-
posed Eurodollar convertible-debt offering because of the potential 
application of FIRPTA.167 This included FIRPTA withholding to the for-
eign debenture holders.168 
B. Blockers 
1. Standard 
The most typical structure is the standard blocker.169 To avoid the 
complexities and costs of the more complicated leverage blocker, a 
standard blocker can be used. The investment, however, does not elimi-
nate the FIRPTA taxes (as a leverage blocker would) but it does avoid 
the reporting.170 The investment is usually made in an offshore company 
rather than through the domestic company; the offshore company will 
then make the investment in the fund.171 
‘‘Using this structure, the blocker functions as the taxpayer, paying 
FIRPTA taxes and filing any required tax returns . . . .’’172 The blocker, 
however, ‘‘blocks’’ the non-U.S. investors from having any tax filing re-
quirements.173 There is no tax efficiency associated with the standard 
blocker. In fact, there may be an additional ‘‘branch profit’’ tax.174 Unless 
the blocker resides within a jurisdiction with a favorable tax treaty with 
the United States, the effective rate may actually rise to 54.5%.175 Stand-
ard blockers are solely used for protection from the IRS investigatory 
power. 
                                                                                                                                         
 165. David J. Herzig, Something From Nothing: Taxing Assets Accurately, 2011 MICH. ST. L. REV. 
1057, 1102 (2011). 
 166. Letter dated May 16, 1988, from Sun Co. to Office of Assoc. Chief Counsel (International), 
Tax Analysts, DAILY TAX HIGHLIGHTS & DOCS., June 13, 1988, at 2392. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Brunson, supra note 2, at 235; Calvin H. Johnson, Why Do Venture Capital Funds Burn Re-
search and Development Deductions?, 29 VA. TAX REV. 29, 52 (2009); Taylor, Blockers, supra note 2, 
at 5--6; Chris William Sanchirico, The Tax Advantage to Paying Private Equity Fund Managers with 
Profit Shares: What Is It? Why Is It Bad?, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1071, 1077--78 n.16 (2008). 
 170. This is because the reporting is limited to the corporate level. See Taylor, Blockers, supra 
note 2, at 5. 
 171. U.S. REAL ESTATE FUNDS AND FIRPTA, supra note 135, at 10. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. 
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2. Leveraged 
A leveraged blocker is usually a Delaware corporation ‘‘that is capi-
talized with a mix of loans and equity from its investors.’’176 Usually, the 
ratio of debt to equity is 3:1.177 ‘‘The goal of this structure is to shield non-
U.S. investors from the U.S. tax filing requirement that FIRPTA imposes 
. . . .’’178 Further, the structure reduces ‘‘the effective rate of U.S. tax non-
U.S. investors will bear on their investment.’’ A properly structured lev-
eraged blocker: (1) reduces the net taxable income of the blocker 
through interest expense; (2) the ‘‘interest payment will be free of with-
holding tax;’’ and (3) ‘‘dividend payment on profit will have low with-
holding tax.’’179 
The leverage blocker structure is as follows: 
 
 
In order to effectively avoid the FIRPTA rules, there are many re-
quirements in a leveraged blocker structure. First, there must be a mini-
mum of three investors.180 This ensures that foreign investors hold less 
than 50% of the leverage blocker’s capital. If less than 50% of capital is 
held in this manner, interest will be deductible.181 Second, this same mix 
of investors will be required to ‘‘minimize the amount of withholding on 
the interest payments.’’182 For example, ‘‘[a]t least three non-U.S. inves-
tors, none of which hold 50% or more of the [l]everaged [b]locker’s capi-
tal and all of whom are either residents of a jurisdiction that has a tax 
                                                                                                                                         
 176. Id. at 5. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. at 6. 
 181. Id.; see also I.R.C. § 884(f) (2012). 
 182. U.S. REAL ESTATE FUNDS AND FIRPTA, supra note 135, at 6; see also I.R.C. §884(f). 
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treaty with the United States which provides for a 0% withholding on in-
terest,183 or are non-U.S. governments.’’184 
Leveraged blockers have many potential structural problems. First, 
although it is tax efficient, it is not best for short-term investments be-
cause it ‘‘could be an expensive and complex structure to establish and 
organize.’’185 Although the expenses can be recouped during the invest-
ment stage, the investment horizon must be adequate to overcome the 
hurdle rate. Short-term investments require too high of a barrier. For ex-
ample, typical private equity investors base their valuations on an inter-
nal rate of return (‘‘IRR’’).186 This IRR is essentially the likelihood that a 
company will be larger, more profitable, and therefore more valuable at 
the time of exit.187 A private equity investor will have a target IRR of 
25% to 35% over their four- to seven-year investment horizon.188 There-
fore, if the initial costs are high and the time horizon is short, the asset 
must appreciate at an accelerated level. Otherwise, the structure will not 
be utilitarian. 
3. Variations on the Leveraged Structure 
There are multiple versions or one-offs of the leveraged structure. 
For example, there are parallel funds, series partnerships, or a combina-
tion of all. A parallel fund structure is designed for real estate funds with 
a global portfolio.189 To avoid subjecting the non-U.S. holdings to U.S. 
taxation, a variation of the leveraged blocker structure is required. There 
would be two parallel funds to isolate the U.S. and non-U.S. invest-
ments.190 
                                                                                                                                         
 183. See Peter H. Blessing, The Branch Tax, 40 TAX LAW. 587, 630 (1987). For example, Austria, 
Belgium, and Denmark all have no withholding. U.S. REAL ESTATE FUNDS AND FIRPTA, supra note 
135, at 19 n.6. 
 184. U.S. REAL ESTATE FUNDS AND FIRPTA, supra note 135, at 6. There are a number of other 
mixes: (1) ‘‘Non-U.S. investors that are not residents of a jurisdiction that has a tax treaty with the 
United States, each of whom holds less than 10% of the Leveraged Blocker;’’ (2) A combination of 
(1) and for example; (3) ‘‘A market-based debt to equity ratio sufficient to maximize the effectiveness 
of the leverage, taking into account property-level debt (perhaps 50%--75% leverage);’’ (4) ‘‘A rea-
sonable interest rate on the debt that takes into account (among other things) creditworthiness and 
type of cash flow from the underlying real estate assets;’’ and (5) ‘‘Non-U.S. investors who reside in a 
jurisdiction that has a tax treaty with the United States to take advantage of reduced withholding rates 
on dividends.’’ Id. 
 185. Id. 
 186. See Oliver Gottschalg & Ludovic Phalippou, The Truth About Private Equity Investment, 
HARV. BUS. REV. (Dec. 2007), available at http://hbr.org/2007/12/the-truth-about-private-equity-per 
formance/ar/1. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Paul Gompers et al., What Do Private Equity Firms Say They Do? 16--18 (Harvard Bus. Re-
view, Working Paper No. 15-081, 2015). 
 189. U.S. REAL ESTATE FUNDS AND FIRPTA, supra note 135, at 11; see also Oscar Teunissen & 
Joni Geuther, Infrastructure Investing: Global Trends and Tax Considerations, 20 J. INT’L TAX. 38, 41 
(2009).  
 190. U.S. REAL ESTATE FUNDS AND FIRPTA, supra note 135, at 11. 
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Further, to maximize the tax efficiencies for non-U.S. investors, se-
ries partnerships could be employed.191 If a structure could be used to al-
low for the exit of the investment as a liquidating distribution rather than 
a dividend, there is no withholding tax and no tax at all.192 Under the lev-
eraged blocker technique, however, the ‘‘[i]nvestors’ interests in a private 
equity fund are part of a pooled approach, and not generally made on an 
investment-by-investment basis, at least vis-à-vis other investors.’’193 In 
Delaware, a series partnership can be separate pools.194 There would be a 
series of partnership units in which the non-U.S. investors would con-
tribute through different blockers. Further, the U.S. investors would in-
vest in a separate parallel partnership. 
Each partnership would then invest side-by-side in the assets. There 
would be as many series and blockers as invested assets. ‘‘When the fund 
disposes of a real estate investment, it distributes the proceeds to the 
holder of the series to which that investment relates.’’195 ‘‘The non-U.S. 
investors are repaid on their investment through debt repayment-----like 
the Leveraged Blocking structures previously discussed-----and through a 
liquidating distribution of the relevant blocking entity.’’196 
Given that ‘‘the blocking entity at that time only holds cash from 
disposal of the real estate investment to which it relates and not an inter-
est in the other real estate investments held by the partnership (on the 
theory that each series is truly separate and distinct), the liquidating dis-
tribution theoretically would trigger no U.S. tax.’’197 The series structure 
is not common, mostly because there is no ruling on treating the series 
partnership as a separate entity. Thus, the use of the structure increases 
not only the reward, no taxation, but the risk. If the entity were not re-
spected, the result would be FIRPTA imposition. 
  
                                                                                                                                         
 191. Id.; see also Treas. Reg. 301.7701-1 to -3 (as amended in 2011, 2012, and 2006, respectively) 
(establishing the difference between a partnership and corporation for federal tax purposes); Thomas 
M. Stephens & Marc L. Schultz, Segregating Assets Within a Single Partnership: Delaware Series Part-
nerships and LLCs, 78 TAXES 231, 233 (2000). It should be noted that series partnerships sound much 
better than they actually are. They have significant downside in the raising of debt financing as well as 
structured exits of partners. They generally do not provide any benefits that are not available in single-
asset private REITs. See, e.g., Chester W. Grudzinski, Jr., U.S. Oil and Gas Interests, Foreign Investors, 
and FIRPTA, 41 REAL EST. TAX’N 113, 127 (2014). Most practitioners utilize the series partnership 
structure out of fear of qualifying a REIT. See id.  
 192. U.S. REAL ESTATE FUNDS AND FIRPTA, supra note 135, at 11.  
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. at 12. 
 195. Id. at 12; see also Susan Kalinka, Assignment of an Interest in a Limited Liability Company 
and the Assignment of Income, 64 U. CIN. L. REV. 443, 467--69 (2009). 
 196. U.S. REAL ESTATE FUNDS AND FIRPTA, supra note 135, at 12. 
 197. Id. at 13. 
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C. Private REIT 
There are many options for pooled investment in real property. The 
most common fractional ownership structures include traditional corpo-
rate structures to tenancy-in-common (‘‘TIC’’) partnerships.198 The pri-
mary limitation to most structures is the limited ability for pooling of 
small investors in multiple properties. TICs, for example, are great for 
single property acquisition but do not allow multi-property risk spread-
ing. REITs were specifically designed to allow small investors to diversify 
their risk in a pool of properties.199 If a traditional corporate structure 
meets the specific requirements of the REIT rules, it can elect to be 
treated as a REIT.200 REIT status allows the corporation to deduct divi-
dends paid to shareholders, avoiding the traditional double taxation of a 
corporation.201 ‘‘To qualify for this special treatment, a REIT must dis-
tribute at least 90% of its net income exclusive of capital gains to its 
shareholders.’’202  
This section will discuss the general REIT rules. Once those rules 
are examined, a key deficiency of the REIT rules will be exposed. Specif-
ically, the rules related to REITs only require that a REIT have at least 
100 holders of beneficial interests, but that rule does not require those 
shareholders have a significant equity stake.203 The ability to use so-called 
‘‘accommodation shareholders’’ allows for private REITs.204 For foreign 
investors not issuing shares of the REIT as a public allows the advanta-
geous tax benefits without the onerous securities rules.205  
                                                                                                                                         
 198. See, e.g., Lenín E. López, A Matter of Semantics: Should Tenancies-in-Common Be Treated as 
Securities or Real Estate Interests?, 8 J. BUS. & SEC. L. 1, 2 (2007) (‘‘The average investor does not have 
the capital necessary to individually purchase a 30 million dollar office park. Within the past 10 years 
the tenant-in-common model of ownership has allowed a number of individual investors to own an 
undivided fractionalized interest in commercial real estate and also defer recognizing capital gains 
from the sale of other investment property.’’); Bradford Updike, Exploring the Frontier of Non-
Traditional Real Estate Investments: A Closer Look at 1031 Tenancy-in-Common Arrangements, 40 
CREIGHTON L. REV. 271, 273 (2007) (‘‘Additionally, TICs can provide an opportunity to own a piece 
of a high-grade commercial investment, which might not otherwise have been available through a di-
rect purchase.’’). 
 199. See Treas. Reg. § 1.897-1(c)(2)(i) (1984). For purposes of this determination the actual own-
ers of the stock, as determined under Treas. Reg. § 1.857-8 (as amended in 1981), must be taken into 
account. The determination date is the date of disposition or any other determination date described 
in Treas. Reg. § 1.897-2(c) (as amended in 2016). BYRNES, HERZIG, & SOVE, supra note 45, § 45:55; 
Brown, supra note 33, at 311--12.  
 200. I.R.C. § 856(a)--(b) (2012). 
 201. Id. § 857(b). ‘‘Unless the corporation is a REIT, it is not allowed a deduction for dividends 
paid to its shareholders.’’ DELOITTE, INTRODUCTION TO THE TAXATION OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN 
U.S. REAL ESTATE 6 (2015), available at https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/us/Doc 
uments/Tax/us-tax-introduction-to-the-taxation-of-foreign-investment-in-us-real-estate.pdf [hereinaf-
ter DELOITTE, TAXATION OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT].  
 202. DELOITTE, TAXATION OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT, supra note 201, at 8; see also Treas. Reg. 
§ 1.897-1(c)(2)(i) (as amended in 2003). 
 203. Taylor, Blockers, supra note 2, at 10--11. 
 204. See Stephen G. Tomlinson, Tax-Exempts Challenge Private Fund Sponsors, N.Y. L.J. (Oct. 3, 
2006), available at http://www.kirkland.com/sitecontent.cfm?contentID=223&itemId=2273. 
 205. Taylor, Blockers, supra note 2, at 10. 
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There are three main requirements for a corporation to qualify as a 
REIT. The broad categories are (1) ownership (at least 100 beneficial 
owners, ‘‘and no five or fewer individuals may own directly or indirectly 
more than 50% of the total value of the REIT stock’’);206 (2) assets (‘‘at 
least 75% of the total value of the REIT’s assets must consist of cash, re-
al estate, loans secured by real estate, or U.S. government securities’’);207 
and (3) income (‘‘at least 95% of the REIT’s gross income must be com-
posed of interest, dividends, and rents from real property, plus six other 
specified sources of income’’).208 There is a final restriction on the type of 
income that qualifies. Since the entity exemption is tied to real estate, 
there is a restriction that ‘‘at least 75% of a REIT’s assets must consist of 
real estate assets, cash and cash items, and government securities.’’209 
There are some key components in the structure of REITs. In order 
to qualify as a REIT, a corporation either has to elect REIT status upon 
formation or be an existing U.S. corporation that reorganizes as a REIT. 
In order to do this, ‘‘[e]xisting U.S. corporations that wish to elect REIT 
status must distribute all pre-election earnings and profits for tax years 
accumulated after February 28, 1986.’’210 There are many ways to avoid 
tax at the corporate level in such a reorganization. Most often, the corpo-
ration distributes ‘‘all net income currently to shareholders thereby elim-
inating the normal double taxation of corporate income.’’211 Fortunately, 
since a REIT is treated the same as any other U.S. corporation, they will 
have the same exemption from the branch profits tax (‘‘BPT’’). Thus, the 
BPT will not impose a second level of U.S. taxation on the REIT.212 Fi-
nally, in order to limit liabilities, a REIT structure often utilizes subsidi-
aries for individual projects. ‘‘REITs are permitted to have 100% owned 
subsidiaries, each of which are essentially treated as disregarded entities 
for income tax purposes.’’213 
There are certain tax implications for foreign investors in a REIT.214 
Since the REIT election is elective and distorts the traditional taxation of 
corporate dividends, there will be a series of restrictions on distributions. 
I will discuss the results cascading from distributions to sale of REIT in-
terests. First, I will address distributions and describe the ‘‘look through’’ 
                                                                                                                                         
 206. DELOITTE, TAXATION OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT, supra note 201, at 8; see also I.R.C. 
§ 897(h)(1).  
 207. I.R.C. § 856(c)(4)(A). 
 208. Id. § 856(c)(2). 
 209. Bradley T. Borden, Reforming REIT Taxation (Or Not), 53 HOUS. L. REV. 1, 23 (2015); see 
also I.R.C. § 856(c)(3).  
 210. DELOITTE, THE IMPACT OF FIRPTA ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN U.S. REITS 2 (2011), 
available at http://deloitte.wsj.com/cfo/files/2012/06/DFPORH2011110600001.pdf [hereinafter 
DELOITTE, IMPACT OF FIRPTA]; see also I.R.C. § 897; Brown, supra note 33, at 312; Taylor, Blockers, 
supra note 2, at 6--7. 
 211. DELOITTE, IMPACT OF FIRPTA, supra note 210, at 2.  
 212. See Brown, supra note 33, at 326.  
 213. DELOITTE, IMPACT OF FIRPTA, supra note 210, at 2; see also Treas. Reg. § 1.856-9 (2004). 
 214. See Robert J. Staffaroni, Foreign Investors in RICs and REITs, 56 TAX LAW. 511, 535--37 
(2003). 
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rule that applies with REITs. Then, I will discuss the consequences of 
sales of the REIT shares.  
If a distribution is tied to the sale or exchange of a U.S. real proper-
ty interest, the corporate form will be ignored and then the gain will be 
taxed as effectively connected income (‘‘ECI’’).215 The ECI designation 
will result in income tax for the foreign person with the source as a U.S. 
trade or business.216 
As we recall, FIRPTA only applies to distributions that are capital 
gain.217 Since most sales are ECI and ordinary, then the FIRPTA rules 
generally do not apply. The downside to this treatment is that many non-
U.S. persons and corporations may be tax-exempt as related to capital 
gain property.218 The recharacterization of income as ordinary may avoid 
the FIRPTA withholding, but at the expense of increasing the tax bur-
den. This trade-off has complicated planning. It also causes secondary 
planning, such as using ‘‘a U.S. partnership to invest in the REIT [which] 
may mitigate potential over-withholding for noncorporate investors.’’219 
But in the private REIT setting, this restriction will not be an issue. 
A key element of U.S. tax treaties is they may not be used to reduce 
the total tax obligations related to FIRPTA or the mandatory withhold-
ing. The backstop to this rule is that foreign investors which have incor-
porated may also be subject to a 30% BPT.220 The ECI designation then 
causes the second order problem of additional reporting. Since ECI is 
ordinary income, the foreign investor would be required to file a U.S. in-
come tax return.221 
One exception to this rule is the 5% rule.222 If the REIT is publicly 
traded, then the U.S. real property interest will not be treated as ECI and 
as ordinary if the foreign investor owns less than 5% of such class of 
stock.223 This reverses the look-through treatment under the default rule. 
The distribution to the foreign investor will be an ordinary dividend as 
                                                                                                                                         
 215. See id. at 561.  
 216. DELOITTE, TAXATION OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT, supra note 201, at 3. ‘‘The effectively con-
nected income of a foreign corporation or international investor is taxed on a net basis at graduated 
rates like those applicable to U.S. corporations, citizens, and residents.’’ Id. 
 217. Id. at 8; see also Treas. Reg. § 1.1445-8 (as amended in 1995); Staffaroni, supra note 214, at 
552.  
 218. The withholding rate is set at the higher corporate rate of 35% until regulations are issued. 
 219. DELOITTE, IMPACT OF FIRPTA, supra note 211, at 2. 
 220. See I.R.C. §§ 871(a)(1), 881(a)(1) (2012); Treas. Reg. § 1.871-7(a)(1) (as amended in 1999); 
id. § 1.881-2(a)(1) (as amended in 2013); id. § 1.1441-2(b)(2)(i) (as amended in 2015) (indicating that, 
except as specifically provided, the 30% U.S. withholding tax does not apply to gains from the sale or 
exchange of property); id. § 1.1442-1 (as amended in 1999). Nonresident alien individuals present in 
the U.S. for 183 days or more in a taxable year, however, may be subject to a 30% tax on U.S. source 
capital gains. I.R.C. § 871(a)(2); Staffaroni, supra note 214, at 561--62. 
 221. DELOITTE, IMPACT OF FIRPTA, supra note 211, at 2; DELOITTE, TAXATION OF FOREIGN 
INVESTMENT, supra note 201, at 4; Richard M. Lipton & Patricia W. McDonald, Foreign Investment in 
U.S. Real Estate: The FATCA/FIRPTA Dichotomy, 120 J. TAX’N 248, 252--53 (2010). 
 222. Temp. Reg. § 1.897-9T(d)(1), (3); see P.L.R. 1996-39-010 (June 13, 1996).  
 223. I.R.C. § 897(h)(1); Temp. Reg. § 1.987-9T(b), (d); see also Lipton & McDonald, supra note 
221, at 258. 
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any other stock dividend and as such not subject to FIRPTA. The genesis 
of the dividend proceeds, e.g., real estate, is no longer important.224 
Consistent with the look-through treatment, to the extent that the 
REIT makes distributions of an interest that is not classified as a U.S. re-
al property interest (e.g., non-FIRPTA mortgage loans or non-U.S. real 
property), the distribution will retain the attributes it had as capital gain 
and not ECI.225 Although some have argued that the statute and regula-
tions may be in conflict, ‘‘the most commonly accepted view by practi-
tioners is that the REIT would also not be required to withhold on such 
designated capital gain distributions.226 
Because FIRPTA creates a look-through to the underlying assets of 
the entity, all distributions must be examined under the same lens. For 
example, traditional returns of capital must be viewed to ensure there is 
not a FIRPTA withholding requirement.227 Unless there is an exception 
under Section 897,228 the REIT is not required to withhold on distribu-
tions paid to foreign persons.229 If an applicable exception is unavailable, 
then there is an additional 10% withholding tax under the FIRPTA 
rules.230 The withholding tax would then require the filing of a U.S. tax 
return to claim a refund.231 This would then subject the foreign person to 
IRS supervision. Finally, the back-up BPT would not apply on basis re-
turn qualifying distributions.’’232 
The final way that an investor of a REIT could have its capital re-
turned is through the sale of the interest. FIRPTA, generally, subjects 
sale of the REIT interest as subject to U.S. tax.233 Under the recharacteri-
zation rules of FIRPTA, the gain on the sale of the shares would be 
treated as ECI instead of capital gains also triggering the return filing ob-
ligation.234 Because the gain is ECI, it would be taxable at ordinary rates, 
                                                                                                                                         
 224. See Lipton & McDonald, supra note 221, at 258.  
 225. Treas. Reg. § 1.1445-8(c)(2)(ii)(A) (as amended in 1995). 
 226. DELOITTE, IMPACT OF FIRPTA, supra note 211, at 2; see also Staffaroni, supra note 214, at 
553--54.  
 227. I.R.C. §§ 301(c)(2), (3)(A); see also DELOITTE, IMPACT OF FIRPTA, supra note 211, at 3 
(‘‘Distributions . . . in excess of the REIT’s current or accumulated earnings and profits would general-
ly be a nontaxable return of capital to the extent of a foreign investor’s tax basis in the REIT.’’). 
 228. This generally means that less than 50 percent or more in value of the REIT stock is directly 
or indirectly held by foreign investors for a period of five years. See I.R.C. § 897. 
 229. Staffaroni, supra note 214, at 568; Taylor, Blockers, supra note 2, at 5. 
 230. I.R.C. § 1445. Withholding does not excuse the foreign transferor from filing a U.S. income 
tax return, but the tax withheld is credited against the transferor’s U.S. tax liability. Treas. Reg. 
§ 1.1445-1(f) (as amended in 2016). At the taxpayer's request, the Service may in certain circumstances 
reduce the amount required to be withheld. I.R.C. § 1445(c); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.1445-3, -6 (as amended 
in 2016). Special rules apply to distributions by certain pass-through entities. I.R.C. § 1445(e)(1); 
Treas. Reg. § 1.1445-5(c) (as amended in 2016). 
 231. Id. 
 232.  I.R.C. § 884(d)(1); Temp. Reg. § 1.884-1T(f)(1); see also Fred Feingold & Mark E. Berg, 
Whither the Branches, 44 TAX L. REV. 205, 211 (1987).  
 233. Taylor, Blockers, supra note 2, at 5; see also DELOITTE, IMPACT OF FIRPTA, supra note 211, 
at 15 (providing that most REITs are subject to FIRPTA because other than mortgage REITs, most 
REITs are U.S. RPHCs).  
 234. Taylor, Blockers, supra note 2, at 5. Also, the return filing opens up the IRS investigatory 
powers. 
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i.e. 35% to corporate foreign investors. Obviously, this is higher than the 
capital gain rates if it was not recast as ECI.235 Investors can avoid the 
ECI rule if the REIT is either controlled by U.S. persons or if the REIT 
is publicly traded (the 5% Public Exception).236 
Foreign investors can continue to game the rules by strategically 
avoiding the ECI applications. For example, an investor may be able to 
reduce the impact of FIRPTA by avoiding ECI through investment in 
domestically controlled REITs and publicly traded REITs.237 Industry 
leaders advocate for avoidance through ‘‘purchasing shares in REITs 
controlled by U.S. shareholders.’’238 Foreign persons owe no FIRPTA 
taxes for the sale of domestically controlled REITs. Under the rules, as 
discussed infra, generally, the threshold is foreign persons owning less 
than 50% of the value of a REIT.239 The application of FIRPTA does not 
change the taxability of the distributions, only the FIRPTA require-
ments. Another option, advocated by industry, is to utilize the publicly 
traded REIT exemption-----as long as the foreign person owns less ‘‘than 
50 percent of the value of a REIT for the lesser of 5 years or the time 
during which the REIT has been in existence.’’240  
So, do REITs work? A general REIT has limited applicability be-
cause the domestic control requirement limits the investment to 49%. 
That limitation might not provide enough equity in the U.S. real estate 
market. Because there is a limit to the leverage a REIT can employ to 
acquire real estate within the IRR parameters, public REITs have size 
limitations. Therefore, the public REIT exception (5%) might be too 
small.241 The use of accommodating parties to create a private domestic 
controlled REIT has moved to the forefront.242 
                                                                                                                                         
 235. I.R.C. § 897(a). 
 236. Staffaroni, supra note 214, at 529, 535. 
 237. DELOITTE, TAXATION OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT, supra note 201, at 2. 
 238. DELOITTE, IMPACT OF FIRPTA, supra note 211, at 4. 
 239. I.R.C. § 897(h)(2); see also Staffaroni, supra note 214, at 547, 563. 
 240. DELOITTE, IMPACT OF FIRPTA, supra note 211, at 4. Congress has continually considered 
increasing the 5% exemption to 10%. See Staffaroni, supra note 214, at 562. 
 241. Id. 
 242. See, e.g., Bradley T. Borden, Rethinking the Tax-Revenue Effect of REIT Taxation, 17 FLA. 
TAX REV. 527, 605 (2015) (‘‘Private REITs generally must ensure that they are domestically controlled 
to avoid causing foreign investors to lose treaty benefits; otherwise, foreign investors will simply ac-
quire interests in publicly traded REITs.’’); Jonathan L. Funk & Scott A. Mclaughlin, Please Dispose 
Properly------Tax Issues and Potential Pitfalls In Disposing of Private REITs, 42 REAL EST. TAX’N 93, 93 
(2015) (‘‘Private REITs have become more prevalent in recent years . . . .’’); Joseph G. Howe, III, Clin-
ton Administration Renews Its Attack on Private Reits: Notwithstanding the Clinton Administration’s 
Proposal, Investments in REITs Continue to Offer Tax Planning Opportunities, 2 No. 3 BUS. ENTITIES 
26 (2000); Taylor, Blockers, supra note 2, at 10 (‘‘There is a significant publicly traded REIT industry, 
but there are many more, by number, private REITs . . . .’’). 
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D. Direct Investment 
FIRPTA clearly applies to direct investment in a U.S. real property 
interest (as defined by the Code).243 The only issue related to a direct in-
vestment analysis is if the U.S. property is not owned in fee simple. For 
example, if a foreign investor owned a building in the United States that 
it net leased, the rentals would be U.S. source income.244 To be subject to 
the 30% withholding requirement and the IRS powers of FIRPTA, the 
foreign investor must not be treated as engaged in a U.S. trade or busi-
ness by reason of such investment.245 The gross rental income (with no 
deductions for depreciation, interest, or other expenses) would be sub-
ject to FIRPTA.246 This generally could not be reduced under tax treaties. 
Alternatively, if the U.S. real estate investment were treated as a 
U.S. trade or business, the investor would be required to file U.S. tax re-
turns and would be subject to U.S. tax at the regular corporate or indi-
vidual tax rates on the net income from the investment.247 Moreover, a 
foreign corporation can be subject to the BPT.248 Regardless, the foreign 
investor would be taxable under FIRPTA upon the sale of the U.S. real 
estate assets. 
IV. JUSTIFYING FIRPTA USING INTERNATIONAL TAX RULES 
Before 1980, a foreign investor took advantage of international trea-
ties and tax rules to avoid U.S. taxation.249 After FIRPTA, investors were 
forced to confront not only traditional international tax principals, but 
also, a seemingly contrarian rule for real property. To understand the 
                                                                                                                                         
 243. Although there is no current tax (unless property is sold) on direct ownership, there are 
yearly reporting obligations. The U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Economic Analysis 
(‘‘BEA’’), however, requires that certain surveys be completed by foreign persons who own substantial 
holdings of U.S. real property. These surveys are issued and collected by the BEA for purposes of 
gathering statistical data on foreign investment in the United States and can be summarized generally 
as follows: (1) quarterly reporting of certain positions and transactions concerning the U.S. real proper-
ty and its foreign owner(s), and foreign affiliates of its foreign owner(s), on the Quarterly Survey of 
Foreign Direct Investment in the United States (Form BE-605); (2) annual reporting of financial and 
operating data concerning the U.S. real property on the Annual Survey of Foreign Direct Investment in 
the United States (Forms BE-15A, BE-15B, BE-15(EZ), and BE-15 Claim for Exemption); and 
(3) benchmark reporting every five years of financial and operating data, positions, and transactions 
concerning the U.S. real property and its foreign owner(s), and foreign affiliates of its foreign own-
er(s), on the Benchmark Survey of Foreign Direct Investment in the United States (Forms BE-12(LF), 
BE-12(SF), BE-12 Bank, BE-12 Mini, and BE-12 Claim for Not Filing). A foreign person’s obligation 
to complete these surveys depends on the aggregate fair market value of all U.S. real property that he 
or she owns (or the total sales, operating revenues, or net income from such property). The filing 
thresholds for the BEA forms are quite high, with a threshold of $40 million for the annual and 
benchmark surveys and $60 million for the quarterly survey.  
 244. DELOITTE, TAXATION OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT, supra note 201, at 3--4; see also Staffaroni, 
supra note 214, at 546.  
 245. See I.R.C. §§ 871(a),1441(d) (2012). 
 246. Foreign investors are allowed deductions only to the extent attributable to income that is (or 
is treated as) effectively connected with the conduct of a U.S. trade or business. Id. §§ 873(a), 882(c). 
 247. See id. §§ 871(d), 882(d). 
 248. Id. § 884. 
 249. TREASURY REPORT, supra note 26, at 12. 
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structuring investors utilized and if FIRPTA should be retained, it is nec-
essary to examine the rules that FIRPTA altered. 
Most often, investors employed the strategy of realizing the gain in 
a company’s real estate holdings by selling the stock of that company ra-
ther than having the company sell its assets. Generally, the company was 
engaged in a ‘‘trade or business,’’ e.g., managing the property, while the 
investor was not.250 ‘‘The investor’s gain, therefore, was usually tax-free. 
Now, however, that gain is taxable, because FIRPTA treats the stock of 
companies that own real estate as ‘real property interests.’’’251 
There were in force a number of treaties that exempted from tax all 
capital gains not attributable to a permanent establishment conducting a 
U.S. trade or business.252 Thus, where gains from real estate investments 
were not so related, the treaty prohibited the imposition of a U.S. income 
tax.253 FIRPTA was obviously a violation of such treaty provisions. In en-
acting FIRPTA, however, Congress provided that prior existing treaty 
obligations were to be respected for four years, thereby allowing the 
Treasury department time to renegotiate treaties whose terms were in-
consistent with the requirements of FIRPTA.254 
Many tax treaties exempt from U.S. taxation any capital gains real-
ized by residents of the other signatory country.255 Although these provi-
sions typically exclude real estate gains from their protection, they do 
apply to gains from the disposition of corporate stock.256 Thus, there is a 
rather direct confrontation between the treaty capital gain exemptions 
and FIRPTA’s treatment of real estate company stock. 
Under U.S. practice, Congress has the power to effectively override 
treaty provisions.257 If Congress enacts a statute that is inconsistent with 
an existing treaty, U.S. courts will apply the statute so that the treaty 
                                                                                                                                         
 250. Stock ownership itself does not constitute a trade or business.  
 251. Kaplan, supra note 11, at 1110.  
 252. See, e.g., Convention on Taxes on Income and Property, U.S.-Fr., art. 12(1), July 28, 1967, 19 
U.S.T. 5280 [hereinafter French Treaty]; Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with Re-
spect to Taxes on Income and to Certain Other Taxes, U.S.-Ger., art. IXA(1), Sept. 17, 1965, 16 U.S.T. 
1875 [hereinafter German Treaty]; Convention with Respect to Taxes on Income and Certain Other 
Taxes, U.S.-Neth., art. XI(1), Dec. 30, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 896 [hereinafter Netherlands Treaty]; Conven-
tion for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Tax-
es on Income and Property, U.S.-Nor., art. 12(1), Dec. 3, 1971, 23 U.S.T. 2832 [hereinafter Norwegian 
Treaty]; see also TREASURY REPORT, supra note 26, at 39--40 (tabular compilation showing all treaties 
with this exemption provision). In each treaty, this exemption is conditioned upon the foreign inves-
tor’s not having a ‘‘permanent establishment’’ in the United States. See id. at 39--40. Most real estate 
investors operating without an office in this country should be able to satisfy this condition. See de 
Amodio v. Comm’r, 34 T.C. 894, 909 (1960) (agent’s office not attributed to principal as ‘‘permanent 
establishment’’), aff'd on other grounds, 299 F.2d 623 (3d Cir. 1962); Kaplan, supra note 11, at 1110.  
 253. Kaplan, supra note 11, at 1110. 
 254. See Foreign Investment in Real Property Tax Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-499, § 1121, 94 Stat. 
2599, 2682. 
 255. See supra note 252 and accompanying text. 
 256. German Treaty, supra note 252, at arts. IX(1), IXA(1); Netherlands Treaty, supra note 252, 
at art. XI; Norwegian Treaty, supra note 252, at art. 12(1)(a); see also TREASURY REPORT, supra note 
26, at 39--40. 
 257. See, e.g., Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888). 
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benefits will be effectively denied.258 This practice is generally character-
ized as the ‘‘later-in-time doctrine.’’259 The practice is upheld even though 
the result may be to place the United States (as a nation-state) in viola-
tion of the treaty. Section 7852(d)(1) of the Code reflects this practice in 
the tax area: ‘‘For purposes of determining the relationship between a 
provision of a treaty and any law of the United States affecting revenue, 
neither the treaty nor the law shall have preferential status by reason of 
its being a treaty or law.’’260 
New legislation does not, however, always replace contrary treaty 
provisions. Congress will sometimes make it clear that new legislation is 
not intended to terminate existing treaty benefits. Legislative overrides 
of income tax treaties, however, have occurred on a number of occasions 
in recent decades and remain a source of concern to treaty partners.261 
A. Source Rules 
FIRPTA section 1124 amended section 861(a)(5) of the Code to tie 
the source of gain from the sale of real property to the definition of a 
‘‘United States real property interest’’ in section 897(c) of the Code.262 
Before this amendment, the source of gain from the sale of real property 
was determined solely by reference to the location of the real property 
sold. Former section 861(a)(5) treated gain from the sale of real property 
located in the United States as U.S. source income.263 Section 
862(a)(5) still refers to the location of the real property sold in stating 
that gain from the sale of real property located in a foreign country is 
foreign-source income.264 
Unlike most other U.S. source capital gains-----which are generally 
not taxed to a foreign investor-----FIRPTA subjects gain or loss of a for-
eign person from the disposition of a U.S. real property interest to tax as 
if the taxpayer were engaged in a trade or business within the United 
States and the gain or loss were effectively connected with such trade or 
                                                                                                                                         
 258. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 115 
(1987); see also Diggs v. Shultz, 470 F.2d 461, 465 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
 259. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 18 (1957) (subsequent acts of Congress override conflicting 
prior treaty provisions); Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 602--03 
(1889) (same); Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888) (same); Rev. Rul. 81-303, 1981-2 C.B. 
255 (providing example); Rev. Rul. 80-201, 1980-2 C.B. 221 (same); Rev. Rul. 80-223, 1980-2 C.B. 217 
(same); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 145 (1965) (subsequent acts of 
Congress supersede an inconsistent treaty if the intent of Congress to override the treaty is clearly ex-
pressed); LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 163--64 (1972) (subsequent acts 
of Congress override conflicting prior treaty provisions). 
 260. I.R.C. § 7852(d)(1) (2012). 
 261. See e.g., Committee on U.S. Activities of Foreign Taxpayers and Foreign Activities of U.S. 
Taxpayers of the New York State Bar Assn. Section of Taxation, Legislative Overrides of Tax Treaties, 
37 TAX NOTES 931 (1987); Richard L. Doernberg, Treaty Override by Administrative Regulation: The 
Multiparty Financing Regulations, 2 FLA. TAX REV. 521 (1995); Timothy S. Guenther, Tax Treaties and 
Overrides: The Multiple-Party Financing Dilemma, 16 VA. TAX REV. 645 (1997). 
 262. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 861(a)(5), 897(c). 
 263. See Treas. Reg. § 1.861-6 (1960) (issued under pre-FIRPTA version of I.R.C. § 861(a)(5)). 
 264. Treas. Reg. § 1.862-5(a) (1960). 
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business.265 In addition to an interest in real property located in the Unit-
ed States or the Virgin Islands, USRPIs include (among other things) any 
interest in a domestic corporation unless the taxpayer establishes that the 
corporation was not, during a five-year period ending on the date of the 
disposition of the interest, a U.S. RPHC (which is defined generally to 
mean any corporation the fair market value of whose U.S. real property 
interests equals or exceeds 50% of the sum of the fair market values of 
its real property interests and any other of its assets used or held for use 
in a trade or business).266 
Distributions by a REIT to its foreign shareholders attributable to 
the sale of USRPIs are generally treated as income from the sale of 
USRPIs.267 Such distributions are subject to 35% withholding.268 There is 
an exception that essentially subsumes the rule. In the event a REIT is 
regularly traded on an established securities market located in the Unit-
ed States, then a distribution by a REIT to a foreign shareholder that has 
not held more than 5% of the stock of the REIT for the one year period 
ending with the date of the distribution is withheld at a 30% or lower 
rate.269 
A different rule applies for regulated investment companies 
(‘‘RICs’’). For years 2005, 2006, and 2007, any RIC distribution to a for-
eign shareholder attributable to the sale of USRPIs is treated as 
FIRPTA income, without any exceptions.270 No Treasury regulations 
have been issued, however, addressing withholding obligations with re-
spect to such distributions. 
The law thus provides rules for taxing foreign persons under 
FIRPTA on distributions of gain from the sale of USRPIs by RICs or 
REITs. Some taxpayers, however, attempt to avoid this rule by investing 
in a RIC or REIT that, in turn, invests in a lower-tier RIC or REIT that 
is the entity that disposes of USRPIs and distributes the proceeds. This 
would then mean that the proceeds from such disposition by the lower-
tier RIC or REIT would cease to be FIRPTA income when distributed 
to the upper-tier RIC or REIT (which is not itself a foreign person). The 
ultimate result is that the distributable amount may be distributed by 
that latter entity to its foreign shareholders as non-FIRPTA income of 
such RIC or REIT, rather than continuing to be categorized as FIRPTA 
income. Furthermore, RICs may take the position that in the absence of 
regulations or a specific statutory rule addressing the withholding rules 
for FIRPTA capital gain that is treated as effectively connected with a 
                                                                                                                                         
 265. I.R.C. § 897. 
 266. Id. 
 267. Id. § 897(h)(1). 
 268. Treas. Reg. § 1.1445-8(c)(2) (as amended in 1995). 
 269. In such cases, the REIT and the shareholder treat the distribution to a foreign shareholder as 
the distribution of an ordinary dividend, subject to the 30% (or lower treaty rate) withholding applica-
ble to dividends. I.R.C. §§ 857(b)(3)(F), 897(h)(1). 
 270. Taylor, Blockers, supra note 2, at 15. 
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U.S. trade or business, such gain should be considered capital gain for 
which no withholding is required.271 
In addition, some foreign persons may be attempting to avoid 
FIRPTA tax on a distribution from a RIC or a REIT by selling the RIC 
or REIT stock shortly before the distribution and buying back the stock 
shortly after the distribution.272 If the stock were not a USRPI in the 
hands of the foreign seller, that person would take the position that the 
gain on the sale of the stock is capital gain not subject to U.S. tax.273 Stock 
of a RIC or REIT that is ‘‘domestically controlled’’ is not a USRPI.274 If 
the stock is a USRPI in the hands of the foreign person, the transferee 
generally is required to withhold 10% of the gross sales price under gen-
eral FIRPTA withholding rules.275 
B. Effectively Connected 
FIRPTA radically changed the accepted definitions for ‘‘effectively 
connected’’ and ‘‘trade or business’’ and the treaties the U.S. entered in-
to, especially those before 1980. These distortions may be permissible if a 
sovereign has a superior right to tax real property other than invest-
ments. If not, then FIRPTA should not be permissible. 
1. General Principles 
The power to tax is an essential attribute of sovereignty because it is 
a necessary instrument of self-government and territorial management.276 
                                                                                                                                         
 271. Id. at 10. 
 272. Id. at 12. 
 273. See I.R.C. §§ 897(c)(1)(A)(ii), 1445(b)(2)--(3); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.897-1(c)(ii) (as 
amended in 2003); Treas. Reg. § 1.897-2(g)(1)(i) (as amended in 2003) (flush language); Treas. Reg. 
§ 1.1445-2(c)(3) (as amended in 2003). 
 274. I.R.C. § 897(h)(2). A RIC or REIT is ‘‘domestically controlled’’ if less than 50% in value of 
the entity's stock is held by foreign persons. RIC stock ceases to be eligible for this exception as of the 
end of 2007. Distributions by a domestically controlled RIC or REIT, if attributable to the sale of U.S. 
real property interests, are not exempt from FIRPTA by reason of such domestic control. A foreign 
person that would be subject to FIRPTA on receipt of a distribution from such an entity might sell its 
stock before the distribution and repurchase stock after the distribution in an attempt to avoid 
FIRPTA consequences. Under a different exception from FIRPTA, applicable to stock of all entities, 
neither RIC nor REIT stock is a U.S. real property interest if stock is regularly traded on an estab-
lished securities market located in the United States and if the stock sale is made by a foreign share-
holder that has not owned more than 5% of the stock during the five years ending with the date of the 
sale. I.R.C. § 897(c)(3). Distributions by a REIT to a foreign person attributable to the sale of U.S. 
real property interests are also not subject to FIRPTA if made with respect to stock that is regularly 
traded on an established securities market located in the United States and made to a foreign person 
that has not held more than 5% of the REIT stock for the one-year period ending on the date of dis-
tribution. I.R.C. § 897(h)(1). Thus, any foreign shareholder of such a regularly traded REIT that 
would be exempt from FIRPTA on a sale of the REIT stock immediately before a distribution would 
also generally be exempt from FIRPTA on a distribution from the REIT if such shareholder held the 
stock through the date of the distribution, due to the holding period requirements. Distributions that 
are not subject to FIRPTA under this 5% exception are re-characterized as ordinary dividends and 
thus would normally be subject to ordinary dividend withholding rules. I.R.C. §§ 857(b)(3)(F), 1441. 
 275. I.R.C. §§ 1445(a), (e). 
 276. See Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 137 (1982) (making the assertion related 
to Indian Tribes).  
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This power enables a government to raise revenues for its essential ser-
vices.277 The sovereign has general authority to control economic activity 
within its jurisdiction and to defray the cost of providing governmental 
services by requiring contributions from persons or enterprises engaged 
in economic activities within that jurisdiction. 
The United States reduces U.S. taxation only on inbound foreign 
investors, while the foreign country reduces its taxes only on U.S. per-
sons investing there. One motivation for this rule, referred to as a ‘‘saving 
clause,’’ is that the U.S. Congress designs U.S. tax policy in the first in-
stance, where all revenue bills are required by the Constitution to origi-
nate with the House of Representatives.278 A treaty, on the other hand, is 
negotiated and signed by the Executive Branch subject to the approval of 
the Senate.279 Thus, the House Committee on Ways and Means, which is 
the primary architect of the tax policy embodied in the Code, has no offi-
cial involvement in the tax treaty process. The constitutional tension be-
tween tax legislative policy and tax treaty policy as applied to U.S. per-
sons is alleviated by the U.S. treaty policy of generally not providing 
benefits of U.S. tax treaties to U.S. citizens, residents or companies.280 
All countries’ sovereignty, including that of the United States, cre-
ates the right to tax the income that arises within its borders.281 Once it is 
established that the United States may tax citizens of other countries, 
there are two specific tax regimes that the United States utilizes to tax 
those foreign individuals.282 These two regimes depend on the nature of 
the income earned. If the income is active, e.g., profit from an active 
business in the United States, then that income is taxed at standard 
rates.283 This active income is known as income effectively connected with 
a U.S. trade or business. The other type of income earned is passive in-
come. This is known as fixed or determinable annual or periodical 
(‘‘FDAP’’) income and is taxed at a flat rate of 30%, generally with no 
allowance for deductions.284 
There are two main taxation events for real property. First, there 
are the yearly investment profits, such as leasing receipts or receipts from 
                                                                                                                                         
 277. Diane M. Ring, What’s at Stake in the Sovereignty Debate?: International Tax and the Nation-
State, 49 VA. J. INT’L L. 155, 167 (2008). 
 278. The Constitution provides that ‘‘[a]ll Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the House of 
Representatives.’’ U.S. CONST. art. I, §7; see also Michael S. Kirsch, The Limits of Administrative 
Guidance in Interpretation of Tax Treaties, 87 TEX. L. REV. 1063, 1090 (2009). 
 279. Kirsch, supra note 278, at 1090. 
 280. Id. 
 281. Knoll, supra note 13, at 709--710. The source rules, which assign income to a particular juris-
diction, are contained in I.R.C. §§ 861, 862, 863, 865 (2012). 
 282. When a foreigner becomes a fiscal resident, such as through the presence of a permanent 
establishment, a country may impose graduated tax rates on income. In such a situation, governments 
allow deductions for expenses (depreciation, interest, and administrative expenses) related to the 
property. In some instances, however, the deductions may be limited to a specified percentage of in-
come or computed on an estimated, rather than on an actual, basis. 
 283. Normal deductions are also allowed. See I.R.C. §§ 871(b), 882(a), 884; Knoll, supra note 13, 
at 710. 
 284. I.R.C. §§ 871(a), 881; Knoll, supra note 13, at 710. 
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property rights.285 Second, are the capital gains on appreciation upon sale 
of the property.286 Governments generally impose withholding taxes at 
flat rates on the gross payment, with the tax rate subject to change when 
a tax treaty between the host country and the nonresident’s home coun-
try is applicable.287 
2. Real Property is Special 
From a treaty perspective, real property is different. Property rights 
are derived from the sovereign. Through its function as a sovereign, any 
federal, state, or local governmental entity may acquire ownership of real 
property through bankruptcy, tax delinquency, abandonment, escheat, 
eminent domain, condemnation, or any circumstance in which the gov-
ernment entity involuntarily acquires title.288 
American legal doctrine has always recognized that the sovereign 
has an inherent power of eminent domain.289 That is defined as the power 
‘‘of taking or of authorizing the taking of any property within its jurisdic-
tion for the public good.’’290 This premise is such that all constitutional 
provisions addressing eminent domain are couched in terms of limita-
tions on the power and not in terms of the grant of the power in the first 
place.291 The predominance of this early view of the eminent domain 
power as being inherent within the sovereign led the courts to make de-
terminations which were consistent and constrained. 
                                                                                                                                         
 285. Knoll, supra note 13, at 712. 
 286. Id. at 713. 
 287. There are also state level taxes. A country may tax nonresidents on income from real proper-
ty through withholding; the state collects the tax at the source of payment with the lessor becoming a 
withholding agent who withholds an amount to pay the income tax. 
 288. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(D) (2012); Rome G. Brown, The Conservation of Water Powers, 26 
HARV. L. REV. 601, 609 (1913); Shelly Ross Saxer, Government Power Unleashed: Using Eminent 
Domain to Acquire a Public Utility or Other Ongoing Enterprise, 38 IND. L. REV. 55, 76 (2005). 
 289. According to the U.S. Supreme Court's classic statement, the taking power is a ‘‘political 
necessity’’ because ‘‘[s]uch an authority is essential to [the sovereign’s] independent existence and per-
petuity.’’ Kohl v. U.S., 91 U.S. 367, 371 (1875); see also 1 JOHN LEWIS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF 
EMINENT DOMAIN IN THE UNITED STATES 7, 672 (3d ed. 1909) (‘‘[T]he power of eminent domain is 
not a reversed [sic] [power], but an inherent right, a right which pertains to sovereignty as a necessary, 
constant and inextinguishable attribute . . . . The power of eminent domain, being an incident of sover-
eignty, is inherent in the federal government and in the several States, by virtue of their sovereignty.’’ 
(footnotes omitted)); Abraham Bell, Private Takings, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 517, 526 (2009). 
 290. 1 PHILIP NICHOLS, THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN: A TREATISE ON THE PRINCIPLES WHICH 
AFFECT THE TAKING OF PROPERTY FOR THE PUBLIC USE 1 (2d ed. 1917). 
 291. U.S. CONST., amend. V (‘‘[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just 
compensation.’’). None of the early state constitutions explicitly granted the power of eminent domain 
to the states. See NICHOLS, supra note 290, at 58 (‘‘The provisions found in most of the state constitu-
tions relating to the taking of property for the public use therefore do not by implication grant the 
power of eminent domain to the government of the state, but they limit a power already existing which 
would otherwise be unlimited.’’). Even the Fifth Amendment is phrased in terms of a restraint upon a 
power that is nowhere explicitly granted to the federal government. See ELLEN FRANKEL PAUL, 
PROPERTY RIGHTS AND EMINENT DOMAIN 73--77 (1987) (discussing the adoption of the Fifth 
Amendment); William Michael Treanor, Note, The Origins and Original Significance of the Just Com-
pensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 94 YALE L.J. 694 (1985) (discussing the adoption and ratifi-
cation of the Fifth Amendment).  
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There is further evidence that U.S. real property is truly under the 
dominion of the sovereign. The government has blocked the acquisition 
of U.S. real property on the basis of national security.292 Treasury issued 
regulations in 2008 explicitly including the acquisition of U.S. real estate 
in the definition of ‘‘covered transactions’’ that may possibly require pre-
closing review by the federal government’s fourteen-member, inter-
agency Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States 
(‘‘CFIUS’’).293 
The CFIUS regulations are an outgrowth of the Foreign Investment 
and National Security Act of 2007 (‘‘FINSA’’).294 ‘‘Under Exon-Florio, 
the President is authorized to suspend, prohibit, or reverse any transac-
tion that might result in foreign control of a U.S. business if national se-
curity interests would be impaired.’’295 
Although the United States, as sovereign, has the ability to take real 
property and stop the sale of real property, it does not have a special 
power to tax the land in the form of a property tax.296 Although the Unit-
ed States has had a property tax-----the Federal Property Tax Act of 
1798-----these first taxes were abolished in 1802.297 Moreover, in 1913, 
Congress passed the 16th Amendment.298 The 16th Amendment stopped 
direct taxation.299 
  
                                                                                                                                         
 292. See, e.g., JAMES K. JACKSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE EXON-FLORIO NATIONAL 
SECURITY TEST FOR FOREIGN INVESTMENT 3 (2013). 
 293. Regulations Pertaining to Mergers, Acquisitions, and Takeovers by Foreign Persons, 73 Fed. 
Reg. 70702--01 (Nov. 21, 2008) (eff. Dec. 22, 2008) (codified at 31 C.F.R. Part 800); see also David 
Richards, United States: Sovereign Wealth Funds and U.S. Real Estate Investment, MONDAQ (Sept.  
15, 2009), http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/83734/Market+Commentaries/Sovereign+Wealth+ 
Funds+And+US+Real+Estate+Investment). 
 294. Pub. L. No. 110-49, 121 Stat. 246 (effective Oct. 24, 2007), expanded the scope of the Exon-
Florio Amendment of 1988 to the Defense Production Act of 1950, 50 U.S.C. app. 2170. CFIUS was 
established in 1975, is chaired by the Secretary of the Treasury, and includes the Attorney General, 
the Secretaries of Homeland Security, Commerce, Defense, State, and Energy, the U.S. Trade Repre-
sentative, the Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy, the Director of the Office of 
Management and Budget, the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors, and three assistants to 
the President. CFIUS is tasked with reviewing these proposed commercial transactions for national 
security implications, but neither the Defense Production Act as amended nor the new CFIUS regula-
tions define ‘‘national security’’ or ‘‘homeland security.’’ This leaves CFIUS with broad discretion to 
decide whether a real estate acquisition that is a ‘‘covered transaction’’ has such security implications. 
 295. Richards, supra note 293. 
 296. Joseph M. Dodge, What Federal Taxes are Subject to the Rule of Apportionment Under the 
Constitution?, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 839, 841 (2009). 
 297. Act of July 14, 1798, ch. 75, 1 Stat. 597 with repeal or nonrenewal, Act of Apr. 6, 1802, ch. 19, 
1 Stat. 148; see also Dodge, supra note 296, at 874. 
 298. Dodge, supra note 296, at 847. 
 299. See id. 
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V. MOVING TO A COHERENT CONCEPT OF FIRPTA 
Tax evasion is a fundamental problem.300 Combating evasion is diffi-
cult. As soon as rules are implemented, advisors begin the arduous task 
of planning around the rules.301 This give and take can be seen through 
the development of the rules associated with foreign investors holding 
U.S. real estate. Before the adoption of section 871, there was no tax on 
nonresident aliens.302 Then the United States decided that there should 
be a more equal playing field and adopted section 871.303 As detailed in 
the Treasury Report, as soon as the provision was passed, investors start-
ed employing a laundry list of structures to avoid the application of those 
rules.304 Then Congress responded with the adoption of FIRPTA in 1980. 
FIRPTA was intended to stop the post section 871 abuses.305 As clearly 
detailed in Part III, however, there are numerous easy ways to avoid the 
application of FIRPTA. Any new legislation would merely result in more 
and more structuring. 
By allowing tax rules to be arbitraged, the United States has be-
come a tax haven for foreign investors. The most prudent course Con-
gress could take is to effectively capture the leakage rather than accept 
the minimal impact of FIRPTA’s current elective form. To accomplish 
this, Congress should expand the scope of FIRPTA to make it more effi-
cient. A net income tax regime with backup withholding should replace 
the gross income tax regime such as FIRPTA. The first step is to imple-
ment a change in FIRPTA to impose FATCA regulations. This would 
alter FIRPTA to provide a complete look-through rule and then follow 
the FATCA regime of information reporting and withholding. 
A. Real Property is Always Source 
Under the standard source rules in international tax, it would seem 
incongruous to have differing rules for the sale of all other capital assets 
other than real property as FIRPTA does.306 It would seem to appear that 
all capital assets should be treated equally.307 Prior to the enactment of 
                                                                                                                                         
 300. See, e.g., Ring, supra note 19, at 126 (‘‘Another explanation may be the recognition that the 
‘unelegant’ version is quite convoluted to attack and by its very nature limited in scope. The elegant 
version, with presumably fewer steps and lower transaction costs, poses a much greater risk and may 
reasonably be singled out for attack. Of course, this assessment may not be factually accurate in every 
case; it is possible that stopping the easy version and forcing taxpayers to pursue the more complicated 
tax planning options ultimately causes more harm due to the deadweight loss.’’); Julie Roin, Competi-
tion and Evasion: Another Perspective on International Tax Competition, 89 GEO. L. J. 543, 544 (2001). 
 301. See Ring, supra note 19, at 126--27. 
 302. Taylor, Blockers, supra note 2, at 7. 
 303. Fleischer, supra note 11, at 462; Kaplan, supra note 11, at 1092--98; Knoll, supra note 13, at 
703. 
 304. TREASURY REPORT, supra note 26, at 45. 
 305. Id. at 11. 
 306. See supra notes 249--53 and accompanying text. 
 307. Brown, supra note 33, at 300; Fleischer, supra note 11, at 491--92; Taylor, Blockers, supra 
note 2, at 7--8. 
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FIRPTA, foreign investors structured U.S. transactions to obtain the 
benefits of ownership as capital.308 
Clearly owning real property in a source country would subject that 
property to the standard source rules.309 The second order problem oc-
curs once that ownership structure is changed (e.g. a stream of income 
derived from that underlying property should there be a look-through 
type rule). This rule would allow the source country to tax the revenue 
derived from the underlying real property even if the form is changed. 
The source of a foreign investor’s investment income is a critical 
component in determining its U.S. taxability. Generally, foreign investors 
are subject to U.S. tax on income effectively connected with a trade or 
business in the United States, regardless of the source of the income.310 
With respect to all other kinds of income, tax is paid only on U.S. source 
income. 
FIRPTA altered these general rules by expanding the capture of 
source income to not only the underlying real estate, but also to the enti-
ty that holds the property.311 A USRPI is defined to include a corporation 
(real property holding corporation, or RPHC) whose assets are more 
than 50% comprised of USRPIs.312 For example, if a foreign investor 
owned stock in a U.S. corporation whose principal assets were real prop-
erty located in the United States, gain on the sale of such stock would be 
subject to the FIRPTA rules.313 
Real property, however, has special characteristics that make the 
right of the sovereign to tax it superior to other countries. This can be 
seen both from the way the property is owned and the exemption in cur-
rent income tax treaties.314 Unlike the source rules for capital gains, real 
property is inherently different in nature, as it is immovable, and the 
standard source rules should not apply. This premise then must extend to 
all manners in which profits are derived from the underlying property. It 
is not adequate to allow the form the property is held to be the determi-
native factor. 
Rather than relying on these fundamentals, when FIRPTA was en-
acted the primary goal was a xenophobic view of the world where the 
narrative suggested that the United States should protect its assets from 
                                                                                                                                         
 308. TREASURY REPORT, supra note 26, at 11. 
 309. Michael J. Graetz & Michael M. O’Hear, The ‘‘Original Intent’’ of U.S. International Taxa-
tion, 46 DUKE L.J. 1021, 1059 (1997). 
 310. I.R.C. §§ 873(a), 882(c) (2012). 
 311. Brown, supra note 33, at 300; Fleischer, supra note 11, at 491--92; Taylor, Blockers, supra 
note 2, at 9. 
 312. Brown, supra note 33, at 311--12 (citing I.R.C. § 897(c)(2)). 
 313. Id. (citing I.R.C. § 897(c)(1)(A)(ii)). 
 314. Current income from real property is typically taxed under the authority of Article 6 of the 
Model U.S. Tax Treaty, while taxation of real property gains is typically allowed under the authority 
of Article 13. UNITED STATES MODEL INCOME TAX CONVENTION at 11, 21 (Dep’t of Treas. 2006), 
available at https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-trty/model006.pdf. 
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foreign ownership.315 Much has changed since the enactment of FIRPTA, 
however. The world has flattened much since the 1980s. With the global-
ization that has happened in the last thirty years, there has been a decline 
in xenophobia as well as an increased amount of cross-border invest-
ment. This has lead to even more resources dedicated to sophisticated 
investment structures that maximize the revenues. 
It is interesting, however, that although the FIRPTA rules had ne-
farious roots, the premise of treating real property different from other 
like investments is well rooted in treatment by other countries. ‘‘Most no-
tably, some countries deviate from the general rule by taxing capital 
gains at source under certain conditions.’’316 ‘‘France and Mexico, for in-
stance, do that in cases where the (foreign) seller maintained substantial 
participation in a domestic company.’’317 A 1964 income tax treaty be-
tween Belgium and France ‘‘specified that distribution of shares of the 
acquiring company pursuant to a fully domestic merger (a merger of two 
French or two Belgian companies) to a shareholder of the target compa-
ny would not be considered as income in the country of residence of the 
(distributee) shareholder.’’318 The purpose of this provision is to equalize 
the tax position of foreign and domestic shareholders in this bilateral 
context. ‘‘Other Belgian treaties denied (an otherwise granted) taxation 
at source right in cases of certain corporate structural changes of corpo-
rations with significant (source country) real property profits.’’319 
By taxing the real property and any profits derived therefrom as 
source income, the United States is doing what all countries strive to do 
which is to have an equal playing field for both domestic and foreign in-
vestors. Although the initial reasons for this leveling might have been 
disingenuous, the result is proper. This is especially true given the unique 
nature of real property. Unlike other assets that are portable, real prop-
erty is stationary and quite easy to account for. There is not a paper trail 
but real land. Treating profits derived from the real property falls within 
the traditional notion of the source rules. 
The movement of most developed countries is to expand on the ac-
cepted practice of looking through ownership structure to the underlying 
real property. For example, in India, this notion was expanded to attempt 
to tax all indirect asset sales at source.320 In January 2012, ‘‘the Indian Su-
                                                                                                                                         
 315. Brown, supra note 33, at 301; Fleischer, supra note 11, at 491--93; Taylor, Blockers, supra 
note 2, at 5--6. 
 316. Yariv Brauner, Taxing Cross-Border Mergers & Acquisitions, 6 FLA. TAX REV. 1027, 1068 
(2005). ‘‘This deviation is a lesser form of the policy mentioned above of taxing capital gains at source 
generally.’’ Id. at 1068 n.232.  
 317. Id. at 1068--69. 
 318. Id. at 1070; see Article 15(6) (a ‘‘dividends’’ article) which became article 15(8) after the 
amendments of the 1971 protocol to the treaty. Id. at 1070 n.237.  
 319. Id. at 1070 (citing The 1998 Belgium - Kazakhstan Income and Capital Tax Convention and 
Final Protocol, article 13 as amended by article 8 of the Protocol, and Article 13(4) of the 1996 Bel-
gium-Vietnam Income and Capital Tax Treaty).  
 320. ‘‘The Delhi High Court has ordered the Indian Finance Ministry to investigate whether the 
$19 billion purchase of Cadbury by Kraft Foods in February 2010 should have resulted in a payment of 
Indian tax.’’ SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, RECENT EFFORTS BY INDIA AND OTHER JURISDICTIONS 
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preme Court found that India had no basis to tax the sale by a non-
Indian subsidiary of indirect interests in an Indian telecoms company, 
Hutchison Essar.’’321 ‘‘The Indian Tax Office argued that the gain accru-
ing to the seller should be subject to tax in India because the gain arose 
from an ‘Indian source,’ and that the Dutch purchaser (a subsidiary of 
Vodafone) should therefore have withheld an amount in respect of Indi-
an tax from the purchase price.’’322 The Supreme Court of India disagreed 
on both counts.323 ‘‘A number of other countries, including India, Peru 
and China, have made recent changes to their laws or enforcement prac-
tices to impose capital gains tax on the indirect transfer of locally-
resident companies and assets.’’324 The broad-based approach taken by 
these countries is becoming more and more prevalent. 
B. Solving Compliance-----FATCA Style Reporting 
If it is true that FIRPTA is well-grounded in the source rules, the 
question is how to enforce FIRPTA more effectively. The structuring 
foreign investors engage in allows them to avoid the underlying rules eas-
ily. Thus, finding an effective look-through rule would be crucial in de-
termining the ultimate owner of the real property so that proper tax may 
be collected. 
In a similar situation, Congress dealt with the problem of unreport-
ed ownership of foreign bank accounts. Rather than attack the offshore 
banking secrecy problem through legislation and the slow movement to 
compliance, the ‘‘political response to the offshore tax evasion scandals 
was swift.’’325 The FATCA regime co-opted the financial institutions as 
tax administrators.326 The debate around FATCA was not should the fi-
                                                                                                                                         
TO TAX INDIRECT TRANSFERS OF COMPANIES 1 (2011), available at https://www.sullcrom.com/site 
Files/Publications/SC_Publication_Recent_Efforts_by_India.pdf [hereinafter RECENT EFFORTS BY 
INDIA TO TAX INDIRECT TRANSFERS]. 
 321. SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, INDIAN TAX ON INDIRECT TRANSFERS OF SHARES 1 (2012), 
available at https://www.sullcrom.com/siteFiles/Publications/SC_Publication_Indian_Tax_on_Indirect_ 
Transfers_of_Shares.pdf [hereinafter INDIAN TAX ON INDIRECT TRANSFERS OF SHARES]; see also  
Vodafone Int’l Holdings B.V. v. UOI & Anr. (W.P. No. 1325 of 2010), available at http://www.indian 
kanoon.org/doc/1488702/. 
 322. INDIAN TAX ON INDIRECT TRANSFERS OF SHARES, supra note 321, at 1; Sumeet Chatterjee 
et al., Indian Tax Office Tells Vodafone to Pay $2 Billion in Tax Dispute, REUTERS (Feb. 17, 2016, 
12:27 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-vodafone-group-india-tax-idUSKCN0VQ0DC?j=162995 
5&e=williambyrnes@gmail.com&l=346_HTML&u=26853030&mid=1062735&jb=0. 
 323. Chatlerje et al., supra note 322. 
 324. RECENT EFFORTS BY INDIA TO TAX INDIRECT TRANSFERS, supra note 321, at 2. ‘‘Peru re-
cently . . . amended its tax code to tax certain indirect transfers of interests in Peruvian corporations 
and, in certain circumstances, permits tax authorities to collect the levy from the Peruvian entity.’’ Id. 
‘‘China has also increased its tax enforcement efforts, with an increasing focus on complex and interna-
tional transactions, and in December 2009, released a publication (so-called ‘Circular 698’), which both 
(i) retroactively (to January 1, 2008) asserts the authority to disregard certain offshore holding compa-
nies used in indirect acquisitions and (ii) requires taxpayers to report certain indirect transfers of Chi-
nese resident enterprises to the Chinese tax authorities within 30 days of the date on which the trans-
fer agreement is signed.’’ Id. at 3. 
 325. Itai Grinberg, The Battle over Taxing Offshore Accounts, 60 UCLA L. REV. 304, 306 (2012). 
 326. Id. at 308. 
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nancial institutions be the tax intermediary but, rather, how should they 
perform the role. 
In the context of FATCA, requiring the financial institution to act 
allowed the government to target the source of the funds. Rather than 
focus on the taxpayer, the entity, or the structure, FATCA looked to the 
account.327 This is the most efficient tax structure. Rather than chase 
structure, the government chased the asset. Financial assets are movable, 
but only among financial institutions.328 
In the context of FIRPTA, the asset is located in the jurisdiction.329 
The asset is not movable. Much like FATCA, rather than focus on the 
structuring, I propose that FIRPTA should be modified to have manda-
tory reporting and withholding with high penalties for failure to report. 
This method is superior to the current withholding system. This proposal 
is in accord with the preference in the FATCA regime advocating for the 
reporting model over the withholding model.330 
The ability of Treasury to implement a FATCA type rule to 
FIRPTA would be remarkably simple. The majority of entities that 
would be subject to the new reporting rules in the FIRPTA context are 
already subject to FATCA rules.331 For example, in the context of 
FATCA, ‘‘U.S. real estate funds, REITs, and joint ventures will be di-
rectly impacted by FATCA’s withholding, due diligence, and reporting 
requirements.’’332 The new requirements ‘‘impose a heavy new compli-
ance burden on many U.S. real estate ventures with foreign investors or 
foreign lenders.’’333 The FATCA compliance rules extend to, among oth-
ers, ‘‘any real estate fund or joint venture having a foreign investor hold-
ing its interest through a U.S. blocker corporation, REITS with foreign 
investors, regular C corporations with foreign institutional investors, real 
estate funds, and joint ventures with foreign lenders.’’334 
There are almost 400 pages of new FATCA regulations for these 
types of U.S. real estate investment vehicles.335 Failure to comply with 
these regulations subjects the U.S. entity to potentially severe financial 
                                                                                                                                         
 327. Id. at 334.  
 328. A taxpayer could always withdraw the money, but then, in order to either invest or purchase 
an item, disclose the source of those funds. 
 329. See supra Part IV.A.  
 330. Grinberg, supra note 325, at 334--35. 
 331. Richard M. Petkun & Sanford C. Presant, Impact of Proposed FATCA Regulations on U.S. 
Real Estate Ventures with Non-U.S. Investors or Lenders, GREENBERG TRAURIG (May 22, 2012), 
http://www.gtlaw.com/News-Events/Publications/Alerts/159679/Impact-of-Proposed-FATCA-
Regulations-on-US-Real-Estate-Ventures-With-Non-US-Investors-or-Lenders.  
 332. Id. 
 333. Id. 
 334. Id. 
 335. I.R.S. News Release IR-2012-15 (Feb. 8, 2012). 
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obligations.336 In order for the U.S. entities to remain compliant, the IRS 
has gone to extraordinary lengths to provide detailed guidance.337 
This proposal would be the exact opposite of the approach taken in 
1984 when FIRPTA was enacted. The 1984 Act amended Section 6039C 
of the Code in order to repeal the information reporting requirements 
imposed by FIRPTA, and to impose new information reporting obliga-
tions upon foreign persons holding certain direct investments in U.S real 
estate investments.338 The regulations under revised Section 6039C of the 
Code, however, have not been revised to date.339 Even though the 1984 
Act enacted very broad withholding provisions, only restrictive provi-
sions have been enacted. For example, the withholding provisions gener-
ally require that a person acquiring property from a foreign person with-
hold and pay over to the IRS 10% of the amount realized by the 
transferor on the disposition.340 
Not only are there regulations, albeit in development, there is also a 
logical starting point for a similar approach under FIRPTA. The striking 
similarity between the two problems is that structuring mechanisms allow 
non-compliance. Therefore, the solution to the FIRPTA problem should 
borrow from FATCA. This structure would allow the effective collection 
of the tax and proper withholding. Although there will be more require-
ments for the U.S. entities, they are experiencing those burdens already. 
This proposal merely piggybacks on the requirements existing in another 
context. 
C. Downside to Aggressive Collection Positions 
The normal downside to an aggressive tax position is the fear of ret-
ribution in the form of decreased investment in the country.341 Given that 
we are in a precarious financial situation as a country, it might not seem 
                                                                                                                                         
 336. If a withholding agent, U.S. financial institution, or FFI fails to withhold the 30% or any oth-
er tax due, they become liable for it, plus interest and eventual penalties. See also Jeff N. Mukadi, 
FATCA and the Shaping of the New International Tax Order, 66 TAX NOTES INT’L 1227, 1228 (2012). 
 337. ‘‘That is why, for example, U.S. withholding agents must sort through more than a hundred 
specially defined terms in these provisions. Similarly, it takes more than 80 pages of proposed regula-
tions to cover what a withholding agent------such as a U.S. fund------must do to determine whether the 
nominal recipient of a payment is the true payee for FATCA purposes and then to determine the sta-
tus of the payee under a wordy and convoluted classification framework.’’ Petkun & Presant, supra 
note 331.  
 338. I.R.C. § 6039C (2012). 
 339. Id. FIRPTA authorized the Treasury Department to promulgate regulations to require re-
porting in foreign persons holding direct investments in U.S. real property interests. Debate over the 
reporting system led to the tax withholding system currently in place, which makes it doubtful, despite 
the language of the law, that the Treasury will implement the reporting requirements any time in the 
foreseeable future. The foreign investor should carefully analyze the tax consequences of a proposed 
investment in the United States. These rules cover not only the taxation of gains on sales of U.S. real 
property, but also income from U.S. acquisitions, and dividends from U.S. investments. 
 340. Temporary Regulations addressing the withholding requirements were published on De-
cember 31, 1984, and final regulations were adopted on December 18, 1986. 
 341. BAILY & SLAUGHTER, supra note 5, at 11; ROSEN ET AL., supra note 5, at 5; Jeffery Owens, 
The David H. Tillinghast Lecture Tax Competition: To Welcome Or Not?, 65 TAX. L. REV. 173, 176 
(2012); Adam H. Rosenzweig, Thinking Outside The (Tax) Treaty, 2012 WIS. L. REV. 717, 744 (2012). 
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wise to create significant barriers of entry for foreign investments. There 
are many places for foreign wealth to invest. 
Special interest groups have provided economic studies done to 
promote the premise that with FIRPTA in place, foreign investment will 
not flow into the U.S. real estate market. ‘‘FIRPTA continues to discour-
age foreign investors at a time when stresses in U.S. commercial real es-
tate are a major threat to America’s economic recovery.’’342 Or as the 
2011 study states, 
addressing these deterrents would correct the inequitable tax 
treatment of foreign equity investment in U.S. real estate and en-
courage the flow of additional capital to domestic assets. Under a 
relaxed or repealed FIRPTA regime, the magnitude of capital that 
would be made available for U.S. real estate investment would grow 
immensely.343 
Clearly, the sky is falling and the only way for foreigners to invest in the 
U.S. real estate market would be for the elimination of FIRPTA. 
The only problem is that there has been no study that has been able 
to quantify that foreign investment is inhibited because of FIRPTA. The 
structuring mechanisms in place make FIRPTA elective for foreign in-
vestors.344 The argument that FIRPTA is somehow preventing inbound 
investment simply cannot be supported. 
Under a normal global economic competition paradigm, the prem-
ise for relaxed investment barriers would ring true. Since the economic 
strains are not limited to the U.S. or a few countries but exist on a global 
scale, however, investors are looking for different investment drivers. 
These drivers continue to favor investment in countries with fully devel-
oped legal structures, credit structures, and creditor protection mecha-
nisms.345 These are all strengths of the United States-----a sophisticated 
and active credit market and the developed U.S. bankruptcy system.346 
This contrarian viewpoint, that the United States is an attractive 
market regardless of the tax implications, is supported by the data. In 
fact, the 2011 Real Estate Roundtable commissioned study reiterates this 
fact: ‘‘Strong demand already exists for investible U.S. real estate assets 
for their relatively stable risk-adjusted returns in the long run and for 
portfolio diversification benefits.’’347 These conditions create an ideal 
portfolio investment for a foreign investor. The United States becomes 
                                                                                                                                         
 342. BAILY & SLAUGHTER, supra note 5, at 11. 
 343. ROSEN ET AL., supra note 5, at 2. 
 344. Kaplan, supra note 11, at 1114. 
 345. See, e.g., Jackson, supra note 2, at 2 (The largest investors are the most developed countries. 
‘‘With over $441 billion invested in the United States, the United Kingdom is the largest foreign direct 
investor, as is indicated in Table 1. Japan is the second-largest foreign direct investor in the U.S. econ-
omy with about $289 billion in investments. Following the Japanese are the Dutch ($240 billion), the 
Germans ($215 billion), the Swiss ($212), the Canadians ($211 billion), the French ($199 billion) and 
Luxembourg ($190).’’); Liang and Yoon, supra note 2, at 6.  
 346. See supra notes 13--15 and accompanying text. 
 347. ROSEN ET AL., supra note 5, at 4. 
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even more attractive as more and more of the alternative countries to the 
United States suffer setbacks (e.g., Spain, Greece, Italy, and France). 
Thus, the current market dictates that the United States should in-
crease its aggressiveness in the tax collection marketplace. The upside to 
a more active and aggressive collection mechanism is more revenue and 
a more transparent system for the United States. Additionally, when and 
if the economy improves in the future, the groundwork will be in place 
for a more expansive collection regime. The downside to this type of re-
gime is lower future investments and a potential drawback of current in-
vestments. These risks are currently limited, however, given the limited 
ability to effectively redistribute these assets globally. 
The proposed reform will lead to accurate data of foreign invest-
ment in the U.S. real estate market. In the event this reporting leads to 
drawdowns by foreign investors, the underlying FIRPTA statute can be 
examined by Congress. The reason that the legislative attempts at reform 
continue to fail to garner majority support is because no one can quantify 
the impact of FIRPTA, both on foreign investment and revenues. This 
reform will allow the government not only to quantify the magnitude of 
the problem, but also to see if there is an investment distortion caused by 
FIRPTA. 
D. Limitations to a FATCA Style Regime 
There might be a disagreement in the use of a FATCA type regime 
to FIRPTA. FATCA was driven by an attempt to identify tax evaders 
who hid behind bank secrecy laws.348 In essence, FATCA did not change 
the substantive tax liability; rather, it enlisted third parties, e.g., the 
banks, to enforce existing laws.349 FIRPTA avoidance is different in that 
foreign investors avoid FIRPTA through permissible legal structuring. 
What is suggested is basically a look-through rule, which is not a report-
ing rule, but maybe a complete substantive revision of FIRPTA. 
This is a partially accurate statement. FIRPTA has two main com-
ponents: the collection of tax, and the investigatory powers of the IRS.350 
Through the structuring mechanisms, foreign investors are not only gain-
ing tax-free distributions not subject to reporting, but also are, avoiding 
the IRS investigatory powers.351 This is factually similar to the foreign 
bank account reporting problem. Moreover, a pure reporting position is 
not necessarily an indictment of the underlying structure.352 Rather, it 
provides the IRS an opportunity to ensure that corporate form and rules 
are in compliance. Currently, there is no such opportunity. Further, it al-
                                                                                                                                         
 348. Grinberg, supra note 325, at 334. 
 349. Id. at 334 n.104. 
 350. I.R.C. §§ 897, 6039C (2006). 
 351. Grinberg, supra note 325, at 308. 
 352. Herzig, supra note 165, at 1102; see also, Joseph M. Dodge & Jay A. Soled, Reporting Tax 
Basis: Dawn of a New Era, 110 TAX NOTES 784 (2006). 
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lows identification of the true owners of the underlying property for fur-
ther compliance with other important rules, e.g., CFIUS.353 
There is a clear trend in the identification of taxpayer positions that 
might draw the attention of the IRS. In the corporate context, there are 
new rules relating to uncertain tax positions.354 Even though the structure 
and ultimate tax treatment might be valid, there is a requirement that 
large corporations report uncertain tax positions on their returns.355 This 
is not an indictment of the position, but rather an opportunity to examine 
the position. If the underlying transaction is proper, the IRS will respect 
the form.356 
The reporting regime of a FIRPTA version of FATCA allows the 
IRS to pierce the corporate veil and examine both that the corporate 
form is in compliance and that the owners of the underlying property are 
proper. This regime will allow the IRS to easily find the game players as-
sociated with FIRPTA avoidance. For example, the group of people that 
utilize aggressive positions such as the total return swap to avoid 
FIRPTA will no longer be under the radar.357 As we have seen in the area 
of 1099 reporting, adding disclosure increases compliance.358 
E. Implementation Structure Through Back-up Withholding 
FIRPTA is unusual because it results in various distortions. If the 
ultimate goal of the tax code is to increase efficiency by preventing dis-
tortions in decision-making, all investments by foreign investors should 
                                                                                                                                         
 353. See supra notes 293--94 and accompanying text. 
 354. See 2010-41 I.R.B. 428, Reporting of Uncertain Tax Positions (Oct. 12, 2010), available 
at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/irb10-41.pdf and the finalized Schedule UTP and instructions released 
on Sept. 24, 2010, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f1120utp.pdf. 
 355. Martin J. McMahon et al., Recent Developments In Federal Income Taxation: The Year 2010, 
10 FLA. TAX REV. 565, 663 (2011) (‘‘The Treasury has published proposed amendments to [Treas.] 
Reg. § 1.6012-2 to require corporations to attach a Schedule UTP . . . to their income tax returns in 
accordance with forms, instructions, or other appropriate guidance provided by the IRS.’’); Sheldon D. 
Pollack, Tax Complexity, Reform, and the Illusions of Tax Simplification, 2 GEO. MASON L. REV. 319, 
344--58 (1994) (describing the tax code as a ‘‘massive and impenetrable edifice of rules and regula-
tions’’). 
 356. In the event that the IRS does not respect the form, the taxpayer may challenge in the courts. 
See, e.g., United Parcel Serv. v. Comm’r, 254 F.3d 1014, 1016--17, 1020 (11th Cir. 2001) (generating 
deductions for insurance premiums paid to a foreign affiliate); IES Indus., Inc. v. United States, 253 
F.3d 350, 352--55 (8th Cir. 2001) (shifting of foreign tax credits and generating capital losses); Compaq 
Computer Corp. v. Comm'r, 277 F.3d 778, 780, 786 (5th Cir. 2001); 106 Ltd. v. Comm'r, 136 T.C. 67, 70 
(2011); Jade Trading, LLC v. United States, 80 Fed. Cl. 11, 56--57 (2007); see also Michael Doran, Tax 
Penalties and Tax Compliance, 46 Harv. J. on Legis. 111 (2009); Sarah B. Lawsky, Probably? Under-
standing Tax Law's Uncertainty, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1017 (2009).  
 357. ‘‘In order to avoid the application of Code § 897 but still participate in the U.S. real estate 
market, some foreign persons have attempted to use certain derivative products or financial instru-
ments to create a synthetic long position in U.S. real estate. Although the use of options or forward 
contracts clearly would not accomplish this result, a total return equity swap may achieve this objec-
tive.’’ Jeffrey L. Rubinger, Can FIRPTA Be Avoided With Financial Instruments?, FLA. B.J., Mar. 
2004, at 44, 44.  
 358. Herzig, supra note 165, at 1079. 
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be treated in the same manner.359 FIRPTA provides a zero rate to in-
vestments in public REITs and a low rate to leveraged blockers, so there 
is an incentive to invest through those mechanisms rather than directly in 
real property. Although the result is clearly distortive, the question is 
whether it is inefficient. If REITs or other investor-arranged pools are a 
more efficient way to pool investment in real estate, perhaps the tax law 
should favor them over direct investment. After all, most capital gains 
are not taxed to foreign investors. A risk then in increasing the tax com-
pliance, collection, and possible rate on this tax would be to potentially 
increase the distortion.360 
These distortions cannot be remedied through legislation alone, 
however. The structuring mechanism and even the use of derivative con-
tracts will always allow foreign investors to avoid detection. A reporting 
system like FATCA will allow the identification of all participants. But 
the long-term solution is to move to a back-up withholding system. 
Specifically, the proposal would be for all buyers of U.S. real prop-
erty to receive either a W-9 or appropriate W-8 from the seller or to 
withhold. If the buyer withholds, the foreign investor would be eligible to 
file a return for a refund. The question would be much like FATCA, i.e., 
how much independent investigation would a buyer of real estate have to 
engage in? The concern is that even with this regime, the reporting could 
not reach foreign investors in leveraged blockers or REITs. For example, 
if one purchases U.S. real property (my house, for example) from a U.S. 
corporation and it provides me a W-9, is there a requirement that the in-
dividual requests to determine if the entity is leveraged and/or has for-
eign shareholders? If so, how much can the buyer rely on the certifica-
tion, or does the buyer need to make an independent investigation? For 
banks, this requirement is not onerous and fits with their existing know-
your-customer requirements. Additionally, there should be a concern 
about the ‘‘moms and pops’’ buying their apartment from a non-resident. 
How will they comply with a FATCA-like regime? Today the only re-
quirement is to ask for a FIRPTA certificate.361 
Additionally, publicly traded REITs with less than 5% shareholders 
presumably would be hard pressed to independently confirm the resi-
dence of all shareholders, especially if it is highly traded. Being able to 
rely on withholding forms solves this, but it just returns us to the structur-
ing issue. Further, this might lead to the failure to consummate certain 
transactions where, for example, cash flow is instrumental.  
The only pure solution is mandatory backup withholding on all sales 
of U.S. real estate (except maybe U.S. individuals) and make the seller 
file for a refund. The main barrier to the implementation of the plan 
                                                                                                                                         
 359. Thus, portfolio interest is inefficient and distorts decision-making because it applies a zero 
rate to most bonds but a positive rate on dividends. 
 360. Presumably, foreign investors could invest in non-real property equities, but there is a rather 
inelastic market for U.S. real property. 
 361. But often this requirement is not complied with either. Thus adding compliance require-
ments is not truly distortive. 
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would be determining who is tasked with the withholding. The most logi-
cal choice would be the escrow companies or closing attorneys. Since 
they are in possession of all closing documentation and closing parties, 
they are in the best fiduciary-type position to collect the data, much like 
banks under FATCA. If a party did not want to comply, then the with-
holding would be done at close. Tasking either the escrow company or 
the closing attorney would be going well beyond their past roles and 
would most likely generate additional costs. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The federal government has come to view foreign investment in 
U.S. real estate as a natural part of the global real estate market, but it 
has kept FIRPTA in place because of the revenue that the law generates. 
More recently, pressures from the turmoil in commercial real estate have 
sparked a number of federal legislators to support major changes to the 
FIRPTA rules. These rules would likely lessen the tax consequences for 
foreign investors and encourage more investment in U.S. real estate from 
abroad, particularly in distressed assets. 
This position is flawed. The United States should take an aggressive 
position with regard to an expansive reporting regime under FIRPTA or 
should use FIRPTA as precedent for the taxation of indirect asset sales 
currently. Rather than continue with the current policy of lessening the 
rule under FIRPTA, as was proposed in 2010 and 2011, the rules should 
be tightened. There is an artificial narrative that the rules need to react 
to the investors rather than have the investors react to the rules. The rea-
son that FATCA works is because there is a need to invest or transact 
business within the United States. These same reasons exist in the realm 
of U.S. real property. There are few investment-grade assets available 
globally, and the United States has a significant number of those assets. 
Therefore, the United States should use this strategic advantage to tight-
en its grip on collection of tax revenues from foreign investors. 
Moreover, if there is a superior right to tax and FIRPTA is norma-
tively correct, the use of FIRPTA principals by a sovereign to use a 
FIRPTA-like regime can cure country-specific failings in both interna-
tional tax law convention and treaties. For example, FIRPTA-like rules 
could be more expansive, such as precedent for all indirect asset sales. 
 
